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Abstract
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale
an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent’s
joint distribution of valuations for the two items is known, and the agent knows the valuation
for the current item (but not for the one in the future). The designer seeks to maximize
expected revenue, and the auction must be deterministic, truthful, and ex post individually
rational. The optimum mechanism involves a protocol whereby the seller elicits the buyer’s
current valuation, and based on the bid makes two take-it-or-leave-it offers, one for now and one
for the future. We show that finding the optimum deterministic mechanism in this situation —
arguably the simplest meaningful dynamic mechanism design problem imaginable — is NP-hard.
We also prove several positive results, among them a polynomial linear programming-based
algorithm for the optimum randomized auction (even for many bidders and periods), and we
show strong separations in revenue between non-adaptive, adaptive, and randomized auctions,
even when the valuations in the two periods are uncorrelated. Finally, for the same problem
in an environment in which contracts cannot be enforced, and thus perfection of equilibrium is
necessary, we show that the optimum randomized mechanism requires multiple rounds of cheap
talk-like interactions.
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1 Introduction
Imagine that a wireless company wants to sell you two phones, one now and one in three years.
You know precisely how much the phone is worth to you now, but for three years hence you only
have a prior. The company knows the joint distribution (for which your prior is the conditional).
How should the company design the sale process to maximize revenue?
If there was no phone in the future, this would be a simple application of Myerson’s theorem
[25]: The company makes an offer easily calculated from your prior. But the second phone makes
things much more complicated. We have a dynamic mechanism design problem.
Dynamic mechanisms are everywhere. We participate in the same mechanism again and again,
and our experiences (during past participations or in between) influence our current behavior. The
adword auction for “car accident” is very fundamentally a dynamic mechanism — even though, to
our knowledge, it has never been treated as one. When you think of it this way, most of mechanism
design seems almost a cop out from the true, dynamic nature of the real problem.
There has been some fine work on dynamic mechanisms (see [5] for a survey ca. 2010), and the
literature is growing fast; some of it is squarely from the algorithmic point of view. Common models
involve dynamic arrivals and departures of agents, e.g. [28, 26, 17, 18], or agents whose private
information evolves [11, 22, 30, 9, 7, 6, 3, 15]. Notice, incidentally, that our model involves neither
of these two dynamic features: it is dynamic in a very minimal way, simply because the information
about fixed types is obtained over time. Techniques and concepts from static mechanism design
such as VCG almost never carry over intact to dynamic mechanisms, and even the revelation
principle is in doubt. Novel techniques such as a “dynamic pivot” mechanism are developed, while
budget balance can occasionally be guaranteed and even revenue equivalence holds under conditions
[29]. Incentive compatibility and tractability via learning algorithms is possible in some specialized
models [21]. But, overall, we believe it is fair to say that we have not seen Myerson’s theorem
in dynamic mechanism design: an elegant, powerful characterization of pristine clarity and ample
generality.
The question is by now mature: Is there a Myerson’s theorem in dynamic mechanism design?
What would it look like? And — this brings us to our interest here — if there isn’t, how do you
prove it? Our group’s past work may be informative in this regard, because a couple of years
ago we showed a result implying that there is no Myerson’s theorem in single item auctions with
correlated bidders: the problem is NP-hard for three or more bidders [27]. The question had been
raised already [8]: “Perhaps the most glaring issue in this whole line of work — the ‘elephant in
the room’ — is computation” by which it is meant “complexity.”
Here we propose the two-day auction problem as a useful surrogate of dynamic mechanisms for
the purpose of exploring the problem’s computational complexity. It is certainly extremely simple,
and yet surprisingly hard. To see why, suppose that your two valuations, for today and for three
years hence, are independent random variables. It is tempting to assume that, in this simple case,
running Myerson’s auction in each round should work (we call this the non-adaptive auction). Is
it optimal? And even if not, it must surely at least be a good approximation?
The answer is “no”! Suppose the buyer on the first day has valuation 2 with probability 1/2,
4 with probability 1/4, etc. until 2n with probability 2−n (and 0 also with probability 2−n; this
is a familiar counterexample valuation, see [19]). Let N = 2n. The valuation for the second day
item is distributed in a similar fashion until 2N (with probability 2−N ). The optimal revenue for
running two separate fixed-price auctions is a constant smaller than 4, since we can extract revenue
at most 2 on each day. (To see this, consider any choice of price 2k for the first day chosen by the
non-adaptive auction, the expected revenue is 2k ·∑ni=k 2−i < 2. The same calculation holds for
any choice of price for the second day.) On the other hand, there exists a randomized mechanism
that extracts revenue n: You bid your valuation v1 on the first day, and you get the item at
full price. On the second day, you receive the item with probability v1/N , and pay nothing. An
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easy calculation shows that this is incentive compatible, while expected revenue is n... Even more
surprisingly, for the exact same valuations, we can extract more revenue than the non-adaptive
auction using a deterministic auction, while for correlated valuations the gap is larger. All told,
there is revenue loss by a non-constant factor between: Non-adaptive algorithms and the optimum
deterministic adaptive mechanism (even for uncorrelated distributions); the optimum deterministic
and the optimum randomized mechanism; the optimum randomized mechanism and the optimum
social welfare (see Appendix A for the precise statement and proof). With the slightest departure
from static mechanisms, truly bizarre things happen...
Our main result is that, for the two-phone problem, it is strongly NP-complete, given a prior with
finite support, to find the optimum deterministic, truthful, ex post individually rational mechanism
(that is, a mechanism that has the trait’s of Myerson’s optimal mechanism). Since we cannot think
of a simpler dynamic mechanism design problem, this result suggests that there is no grand sweeping
positive result lurking somewhere in the realm of dynamic mechanism design. In contrast, we show
that we can compute the optimal randomized auction in polynomial time, and in fact for any finite
number of periods of sale and for any finite number of buyers; Something similar happens in the
case of correlated bidders ([13],[27]).
We first characterize the mechanisms of interest (Section 2). It turns out that there is always
an optimum deterministic mechanism that is semi-adaptive (Lemma 1). As we already saw, a
non-adaptive mechanism is one that makes two independent offers, one now and one in the future,
without eliciting any input from the buyer. In contrast, a semi-adaptive mechanism starts by elicit-
ing the buyer’s type (and takes care that she is truthful), and then makes two offers simultaneously,
one for now and one for the future. The buyer can take or leave the first offer now, and come back
in three years to take or leave the second offer (which she knows now). Incidentally, it is quite
unusual in mechanism design that a price is based crucially on a bid, but in our optimal mechanism
it does. So, all we have to do is, design a function, informed by the whole joint distribution, that
maps the support of the buyer’s current distribution to two prices. It is not so easy...
One of the reasons is that truthfulness is quite subtle in this context, and incentive compatibility
constraints are a big part of the problem’s difficulty. You give the buyer the right incentives (both
right now and in future expectation) so she will not misrepresent her type. This is done by choosing
price pairs such that, for any other current valuation, the buyer is best off, in expectation, telling
the truth. Low prices now must be counterbalanced carefully with higher prices in the future, and
the inequalities involve integrals of the cumulative conditional distributions of the future valuation.
In Section 3 we describe our NP-completeness proof, from Independent Set. It is quite
elaborate. The types (support points of the current distribution) are the nodes. For each type,
two of the possible current prices stand out as potentially optimal, and choosing between them is
tantamount to deciding whether a node will be in the maximum independent set. The optimum
revenue achieved is a strictly increasing function of the independent set size. The truthfulness
constraints enforce that no two adjacent nodes are included, and this necessitates a very elaborate
design of the conditional distributions associated with the nodes.
In Section 4 we have a few positive results for deterministic mechanisms: If the support of
the distribution of the first-day valuation is finite, then the problem becomes easy, through linear
programming. We conjecture that the same is true if the second-day conditional has finite support,
or if the distribution is affiliated. If we are given the first-round prices and we want to optimize
the second-round prices, this can be approximated by an FPTAS, based on an integer program
that happens to be totally unimodular (the precise approach we advise our students to never take
happens to work here...). The other way (fixing future prices) is also true. These two last positive
results point to the source of one major difficulty in proving NP-completeness of the problem: The
prices of both items must vary over types... We also show how to compute the optimal deterministic
mechanism when the days are independent: we prove that the optimal mechanism in this case has
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a rich structure which we exploit to reduce the search space.
In Section 5 we show that the problem of finding the optimum randomized mechanism can
be done in polynomial time, and in fact for any finite number of periods of sale and for any finite
number of buyers. We first reduce the randomized auction to a simple form (basically, all prices are
on the support), and then we write a linear program for the optimum mechanism; several reasons
why this LP should be exponential must be overcome.
All these results imply that the auctioneer can increase her revenue by committing to a specific
future behavior, presumably through a contract. In Section 6 we consider a closely related question,
what is the revenue-optimal design when contracts about future behavior cannot be written and
enforced, and thus the auctioneer cannot commit to an irrational behavior in the future, such as
doing something that may be suboptimal at the time? In this setting, we demonstrate a different
facet of the complexity of dynamic mechanisms: The revenue-optimal randomized auction requires
the auctioneer and bidder to interact through multiple rounds of communication in the first period
(we can prove three, and we conjecture an unbounded number). That is to say, the revelation
principle fails rather catastrophically here. We see this phenomenon as a novel aspect of the
complexity of dynamic mechanism design.
2 The Auction
The Two-day Auction problem involves one bidder and two items auctioned in two periods called
“days.” The bidder can be in one of n types. The ith type has probability pi, valuation v
1
i for the
first item, and probability distribution fi over valuations for the second item. Our goal is to design
an auction that maximizes the designer’s revenue, subject to incentive compatibility (IC) and ex
post individual rationality (IR); we shall specify these constraints soon.
What can we say about the structure of revenue-optimal dynamic auctions? The point of this
paper is that they are quite complex. Nonetheless we can significantly restrict our search space.
Call a mechanism semi-adaptive if it depends on the buyer’s declared type. In such a mechanism
the buyer submits a bid for the first day, and the seller, based on it, produces a price p for the first
day and a price q for the second (a price can be infinity, in which case the seller does not offer this
item).
Semi-adaptive auctions are optimal
Rather surprisingly, this seemingly weak protocol is optimal.
Lemma 1. There is a revenue-optimal mechanism which is semi-adaptive.
Proof. Suppose that in a deterministic revenue-optimal auction satisfying incentive compatibility
and ex-post individual rationality, the price on the second day q(v1, v2) depends on the buyer’s valu-
ations on both days, v1 and v2. Fix any first-day valuation v1 = w, and let u∗ = argminu≥q(w,u) q(w, u)
be the second-day valuation which minimizes that second day price, among all second-day valua-
tions for which the item is allocated.
• v2 > q(w, u∗): the buyer could declare valuation u∗ in order to buy the item for the minimum
price. Therefore, since the auction is incentive compatible, it must charge q(w, v2) = q(w, u∗).
• v2 < q(w, u∗): we can assume wlog that the price is again q(w, u∗), since the buyer would not
buy the item anyway for the current price q(w, v2)(≥ q(w, u∗)).
• v2 = q(w, u∗): the buyer’s utility remains zero for any price q(w, v2) ≥ q(w, u∗); however, the
auctioneer’s revenue is clearly maximized when selling the item for price q(w, v2) = q(w, u∗)
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Finally, any buyer with a different first-day valuation v1 = w′ that attempts to deviate and
declare valuation w on the first day, would wlog also deviate her second-day valuation to u∗.
Note that it is not clear whether the same is true for randomized auctions, because we do not
have an order over distributions of prices: one distribution may be more attractive to one type,
while another distribution is more attractive for another type.
Incentive compatibility constraints
Once we restrict ourselves to semi-adaptive auctions, the auction becomes two functions p, q map-
ping the support of the prior to the reals. Let p(v) be the price charged for the first day item, and
q(v) the price charged for the second day item, when the bidder reports valuation v. Let u(v, v′)
be the expected utility of the bidder when her true value in day one is v and she declares v′. This
utility is the utility of the first day plus the expected utility for the second day, when offered a
take-it-or-leave-it price q(v′). We want u(v, v) ≥ u(v, v′) for all v, v′.
A nice, compact form to express our IC constraints is using the cumulative distribution of the
second day: Fv(x) = Pr[v2 ≥ x|v1 = v]. The observation here is that the buyer’s second day utility
for valuation v, when charged price q in day 2, is
∫∞
q Fv(x)dx. So, for any two possible first-day
valuations v and v′, the IC constraints are:
• If both v and v′ receive the item on the first day:
∫ q(v)
q(v′)
Fv′(x)dx ≥ p(v′)− p(v) ≥
∫ q(v)
q(v′)
Fv(x)dx
• If neither receives the item on the first day:
q(v) = q(v′)
• If v′ receives the item on the first day, but v does not:
∫ q(v′)
q(v)
Fv(x)dx ≥ v − p(v′)
v′ − p(v′) ≥
∫ q(v′)
q(v)
Fv′(x)dx
We will write Rev(ti, pi, qi) to denote the auctioneer’s revenue, when charging type ti the first
day price pi and second day price qi. We will write Rev
1 or Rev2 when we want to refer only to
the revenue from the first or second day, respectively.
3 Deterministic auctions are NP-hard
Theorem 2. Finding the optimal two-day auction is strongly NP-hard.
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Outline
Given a graph G = (V,E), we construct a joint distribution of valuations such that the optimal
feasible revenue (for deterministic IC and IR auctions) is a strictly increasing function of the
maximum independent set in G.
More specifically, with each vertex i ∈ G we associate a type ti with valuation v1 = Bi for
the first day. For each type ti, we want to have two candidate price pairs: (Bi, Ci) or (Ai,Di).
The former will give more revenue, but for every edge (i, j) ∈ E, it will be a violation of the IC
constraints to charge both type ti (Bi, Ci) and type tj (Bj , Cj). Thus, if the difference r in expected
revenue between (Bi, Ci) and (Ai,Di) is the same for all i, charging the former for all the vertices of
an independent set S and the latter for the rest of the vertices will be a valid pricing, with revenue∑
i∈V Rev(ti, Ai,Di) + r|S|.
In order to impose the (Bi, Ci) vs (Ai,Di) structure, we have an extra type t
∗, with valuation
v1 = P ∗ on the first day. t∗ appears with very high probability. This way we make most of our
revenue from this type, and thus force every revenue-optimal auction to charge this type the optimal
prices, (P ∗, Q∗). The IC constraints for type t∗ introduce strong restrictions on the prices for other
types.
The restriction on each edge (i, j) is forced by the IC constraints for ti and tj, via a careful
construction of the distributions over their second-day valuations. The second day distribution of ti
will be Fi and will change behavior between Dj−1 and Dj depending on whether or not (i, j) ∈ E.
See Figure 1.
xCi Di Dj−1 Cj Dj
Fi
Fj
Pr[u2 ≥ x]
Figure 1: Fi when there is (dotted) and when there isn’t (dashed) an (i, j) edge, for j > i
Construction
The distribution of valuations on the first day is rather simple. Let n = |V | denote the number of
vertices in G. With probability 1−p, the buyer is of type t∗ and has first-day valuation v1 = P ∗ = n;
with probability p·wi, the buyer is of type ti and has first-day valuation v1 = Bi = n2+2n+1−i, i ∈
[n]. The parameters p and wi will be defined soon. Notice that the first day has support of size
n+ 1.
We will show that it is always possible to charge type i either her full value Bi on day 1, or
slightly less: Ai = Bi − ǫ, for ǫ = 1/n2. For type t∗, we always want to charge the full price, P ∗.
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Observe that
P ∗ < An < Bn < · · · < A1 < B1.
Furthermore, Bi −Bj = j − i = Ai −Aj , Bi −Aj = j − i+ ǫ, and Ai −Bj = j − i− ǫ.
For the second day we are interested in pricings Ci or Di for ti, and Q
∗ for t∗. Although we
only have n types, it will be convenient to think about two more special prices, which we denote
Cn+1 and Dn+1. We will define Ci, Di and Q
∗ later; for now let us mention that
C1 < D1 < · · · < Cn < Dn < Cn+1 < Dn+1 < Q∗.
Second day valuations
The crux of the reduction lies in describing the distributions of the second-day valuations for each
type. It will be convenient to describe the cumulative distributions Fi(z) = Pr[v
2 ≥ z|ti] and
F∗(z) = [v
2 ≥ z|t∗].
The choices of the cumulative distributions in our construction are summarized in Table 1. Type
ti never has nonzero second-day valuation less than Ci, thus the cumulative distribution Fi(x) for
x ∈ (0, Ci) is hi = γ−4i, for γ = 1 + 1/n. Intuitively, this will make Ci an attractive price for the
auctioneer. Notice that γn ≈ e is a constant.
At each special price thereafter, Fi decreases by some multiplicative factor that is related to
γ. The exact value of Fi(x) for x ∈ (Dj−1,Dj) depends on whether there is an edge (i, j) in
G.1 After Dn+1, the distribution for all types ti is the same. Fi halves at each 2
kDn+1, and it
is 0 after Q∗ = 28γ
4(n+1)
Dn+1. We use a similar construction (pow2) in Appendix A to construct
distributions which yield low revenue, but high social welfare.
The distribution F∗ is simpler to describe. F∗(x) is h1 for x ∈ (0, C1), and decreases by a
multiplicative factor of γ2 at each special price thereafter. Type t∗ never has valuations between
Dn+1 and Q
∗ = 28γ
4(n+1)
Dn+1. F∗ is constant in this domain; in particular F∗(x) = h∗ =
An+1−P ∗
Q∗−Dn+1
.
Intuitively, this will make Q∗ an attractive price for the auctioneer. Notice also the contrast between
this and the gradual decrease of Fi’s.
We describe how to fix the last parameters in Appendix B.1. Proofs of completeness and
soundness of the construction are postponed to Appendix B.2.
4 Deterministic cases solvable in polynomial time
We have three positive results for deterministic mechanisms:
Theorem 3. If the prices in the first day are fixed, then the optimum deterministic mechanism
can be approximated by an FPTAS.
Theorem 4. If the number of types (the support of first-day valuations) is constant, then the
optimum deterministic mechanism can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 5. If the days are independent, the optimum deterministic mechanism can be computed
in polynomial time.
We give here a brief sketch of the proofs. For the first result, we subdivide the range of second-
day prices into a grid of accuracy 1K (by taking K large enough we obtain an FPTAS), and consider
1For the extra special prices, Cn+1 and Dn+1, assume that all Fi’s behave as in the ”no edge” case.
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0− 1 variables with meaning “the price qi is not larger than the jth grid point.” It turns out that
the IC constraints become totally unimodular (for more details see Appendix C.)
For the second result, we notice that once we have fixed, for each type, the interval between
second-day valuations in which the second-day price for this type lies (larger than all if the item
is not allocated to this type), then the IC constraints become linear inequalities. This is because
the cumulative distributions are piecewise constant, and thus the integrals in the IC constraints
become linear functions once we know the interval in which the bounds of each integral lie. Since
there are |V2||V1| ways to map the |V1| second-day prices to the |V2| second-day intervals, and we
assume that |V1| is constant, we only need to solve a polynomial number of LPs.
For the third result, we observe that once correlation is removed the IC constraints between
different types are transitive: satisfied IC constraints between types i,j and j,k imply satisfied
constraints between i and k. Moreover, the allocation function (for the first day item) is monotone,
and the prices of the types that are allocated the first day item have extra structure: either the
first day price is equal to the valuation, or the second day price is zero. Using these observations
we can significantly reduce the search space and find the optimal mechanism in polynomial time,
essentially by enumerating. Details can be found in Appendix D.
5 Randomized auctions
Can we do better by using randomization? We first construct an LP that gives a randomized
mechanism that performs at least as well — and sometimes much better — than the optimal
deterministic mechanism. A randomized semi-adaptive auction takes as input the buyer’s declared
type on day one, and outputs a distribution over pairs of prices. As we have stated after the proof of
Lemma 1, it is not clear that the optimum randomized auction is semi-adaptive. But the optimum
semi-adaptive randomized auction has at least as good a revenue as any two-day deterministic
auction.
A key observation that significantly reduces the search space is the following: when considering
randomized auctions, we can assume without loss of generality that every price in the support is
exactly equal to a feasible valuation in the support of buyer’s types, zero, or infinite.
Lemma 6. Let V d be the set of possible valuations on day d. Then given any semi-adaptive auction
A (randomized or deterministic), there exists a randomized semi-adaptive auction A′, with at least
as good revenue, which on day d only offers prices in V d ∪ {0,∞}.
Proof. Let V d =
{
vd1 ≤ vd2 ≤ · · · ≤ vdn
}
, and let vd0 = 0 and v
d
n+1 = ∞. Let pd ∈ (vdi , vdi+1) be a
possible price A charges on day d. We can construct an auction A′ identical to A, except that A′
asks for vdi and v
d
i+1 on day d with different probabilities, and never asks for p
d. Applying this
argument recursively proves the claim.
Let π, πi, πi+1 be the probabilities that A charges pd,vi and vi+1 respectively, on day d, and
pd = αvdi +(1−α)vdi+1. ThenA′ simply charges vdi with probability πi+απ and vdi+1 with probability
πi+1 + (1− α)π. Observe that the expected price is the same.
Notice that the probability of allocation of the item on day d can only increase: if the buyer
bought the item on day d for price pd, her valuation could only be vdj ≥ vdi+1, so the probability
she buys is unchanged. If she didn’t buy with price pd and her valuation was vdi , she will buy with
(απ) higher probability in A′. When vdj < vdi nothing changes.
Since the probability of allocation increases, with the same expected prices, the revenue also
increases. On the other hand the buyer’s utility remains unchanged between A andA′: the expected
price is the same, and the extra probability of allocation comes from cases when the buyer pays
her valuation. Thus, the IC constraints of A continue to hold in A′.
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It is easy to see that this proof did not use in any crucial way the semi-adaptive property, so
this normalization is possible for all randomized auctions. We are now ready to describe our LP
for two-day semi-adaptive randomized auctions:
Theorem 7. The optimal two-day semi-adaptive randomized auction can be found in time polyno-
mial in the number of types.
Proof. We construct an LP of size O
(∣∣V 1∣∣ · (∣∣V 1∣∣+ ∣∣V 2∣∣)) that optimizes over all two-day semi-
adaptive randomized auctions:
• Variables: The variables in our LP will specify the distribution of prices given the valuation
on the first day. Notice that because of the restriction on the class of auctions, we can assume
wlog that given the valuation on the first day, the prices on the two days are independent.
Let the variable x
(
d, p, v1
)
denote the probability that we offer the item on day d for price p
given first-day valuation v1. By Lemma 6, we only need to consider V d + 2 different prices
on each day.
• Objective: Our expected revenue on the first day is given by:
Rev1 =
∑
v1
∑
p≤v1
x
(
1, p, v1
)
Pr
[
v1
] · p
On the second day, we must also sum over the new valuations v2
Rev2 =
∑
v1
∑
v2
∑
q≤v2
x
(
2, q, v1
)
Pr
[(
v1, v2
)] · q
Our objective is to maximize the total revenue:
maxRev1 +Rev2
• Feasibility constraints: In order for x (d, p, v1) to be feasible probabilities, their sum, for
each d and v1 must be one:
∀d ∈ {1, 2} ∀v1
∑
p
x
(
d, p, v1
)
= 1
Similarly, they should all be non-negative:
∀d ∈ {1, 2} ∀v1∀p x (d, p, v1) ≥ 0
• IC constraints: Given that the buyer’s true valuation on the first day is v1, her utility from
declaring u is given by:
U
(
v1, u
)
=
∑
p≤u
x (1, p, u) · (v1 − p)+∑
v2
∑
q≤v2
x (2, q, u) · (v2 − q) · Pr[v2|v1]
The IC constraints require that
∀ (v, u) U (v, v) ≥ U (v, u)
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Notice that the IR constraints are implied by the fact that we only add up prices smaller than
valuations. The variables x(d, p, u) for p > u don’t show up anywhere in the LP.
In Appendix E we prove the following:
Theorem 8. For any number of days D, and a constant number of independent bidders k, the
optimal adaptive randomized auction can be found in time polynomial in the number of types and
in the number of days.
The main difficulty in writing the LP for this, much stronger, result concerns the IC constraints:
naively there is an exponential number of them. Lying on day one could decrease the buyer’s utility,
and so does lying on day two; and yet lying on both days increases her expected utility. Therefore,
when deciding to lie, the buyer must choose in advance among all exponentially many different
strategies that deviate from the truth now and in the future. Notice that the number is exponential
even for two days: the optimization is over functions from true pairs of types to declared pairs of
types. To get around this problem, we embed a dynamic program into the IC constraints part of
the LP. Details are in Appendix E.
6 No contract
In this section we restrict the two-phones problem to the design of mechanism where the auctioneer
cannot commit to an action in the future. There are indeed many well studied situations in
economics in which contracts are impossible, legally problematic, or costly to enforce (see for
example [1], [2] ). But beyond this consideration, the no-contract case raises hopes of escaping the
negative results in the rest of this paper: Since the second stage of any no-contract mechanism is
trivial (the designer will make a Myerson offer), perhaps the overall complexity can be more modest.
Let us clarify the model a bit: “No contract” means that it is impossible to sign and enforce contracts
that span the two periods. However, the auctioneer can commit to any (possibly randomized)
behavior during the first period, including in future stages of a multi-stage communication that
takes place during the first period.
We point out that the no-contract dynamic mechanism design problem faces an obstacle of
a very different nature: the revelation principle no longer holds on the first day, and in a very
strong sense. More specifically, we prove that the optimal no-contract mechanism requires multiple
rounds of communication on the first day. Our lower bound does not depend on any computation
or communication limitations and is based purely on the structure of the agents’ information (in
contrast to e.g. [10, 14]). Before we continue into the details we remark that there is a beautiful
literature by economists and game theorists on lower bounds on the number of rounds in cheap talk
(e.g. [16, 4, 23, 24]). The concepts there are quite similar to what happens here, but the techniques
are rather different.
Model and result
In the No-contract Two-day Auction problem, we again have one bidder and two items
auctioned in two days. The communication between the auctioneer and the bidder on the first day
is used to determine the price and allocation of the first item, as well as update the auctioneer’s prior
about the bidder’s type. On the second day, the auctioneer offers the second item for the Myerson
optimal price given the updated prior. Our goal is to design an IC and ex-post IR mechanism for
the first day that maximizes the auctioneer’s expected total revenue from both days.
Theorem 9. The optimal mechanism for the No-contract Two-day Auction requires multiple
rounds of communication on the first day.
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How can extensive communication increase revenue?
We construct an example where the bidder’s valuations on the two days are independent, yet on
the first day she has a more refined prior over her second-day valuations. Furthermore, she has
a strong incentive to share her information about the second period with the auctioneer (while
the auctioneer is approximately indifferent). In order to credibly report her information about the
second period, she needs the auctioneer’s help in setting up an incentive compatible mechanism.
Informally, the auctioneer now has another “product” she can sell for profit: the opportunity to
report information about the second period. We will refer to this new product as OTR, for the
“opportunity to report.”
The OTR has two important properties that distinguish it from the real items sold in the
auction: (1) because it is not a real item, it does not contribute to the bidder’s valuation when
evaluating the IR constraints; and (2) the auctioneer knows its ex-interim value to the bidder (we’ll
set things up so that this value is independent of the partial information the bidder has in the first
period; see Bullet Value of OTR in Lemma 37). This latter property is useful when considering
the IC constraints.
How does the OTR lead to multiple rounds of communication? In order to satisfy the IR
constraints, the OTR must be bundled with the first (real) item. Given the results from recent
years about menu complexity (e.g [20, 12]), it is not surprising that the optimal way to sell this
bundle is fractional; i.e. for each price π, the bidder receives the OTR with some probability
ρOTR (π) (and the real item with probability ρ1 = 1 to satisfy the ex-post IR constraints). Thus
we have: in round 1, the bidder places a bid; in round 2, the auctioneer allocates the OTR with
some probability that depends on the bid; and in round 3, if allocated the OTR, the bidder reports
her information about the second period.
The details of the construction are deferred to Appendix F.
7 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper we studied the two-day auction problem in the contract and no-contract case. When
the auctioneer can commit to a contract, we showed that computing the optimal deterministic
mechanisms is an NP-hard problem, and identified some tractable special cases: independent days,
fixed first day prices and constant first day support. Also, the optimal randomized mechanism can
be computed in polynomial time, even when we consider multiple days and multiple bidders. We
also proved that when the auctioneer cannot commit to a future contract we have a very different
kind of obstacle to overcome: multiple communication rounds.
There are still many interesting directions to pursue. In the two-day deterministic case, constant
approximations might still be achievable in the general, NP-hard case (our current proof does not
even establish APX-completeness). Also, there may be other tractable special cases. Our reduction
constructs complicated second-day distributions. For example, what if the valuation distribution is
“affiliated” (higher first day valuation implies higher second day valuation)? Is this case tractable?
And if so, can these results be extended to multiple days and multiple bidders?
Another open question, from an algorithmic point of view, is relaxing the ex-post IR constraint.
In the economics literature we have seen something similar in the work of Courty and Li ([11])
where airplane tickets refunds are sold before the agents see their valuation for them, and refunds
are allowed. Is the two-day auction equivalently tractable in this case?
Finally, regarding the no-contract case: Can we construct examples with arbitrarily many
rounds of communication?
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A Separations
We have considered deterministic and randomized auctions; we are now going to compare them in
terms of the revenue generated, against each other and against two other benchmarks:
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• the optimal non-adaptive auction — i.e. running an independent Myerson’s auction on each
day; and
• the optimal social welfare SW — the expected utility of the buyer from receiving both items
for free.
The following is immediate:
Fact 10. For any distribution of valuations,
Rev (non-adaptive) ≤ Rev (deterministic) ≤ Rev (randomized) ≤ SW
But are these inequalities strict for some valuation distributions? And by how much?
Theorem 11. Let v∗ be the maximal buyer’s valuation in any day, and assume that all valuations
are integral. Then in any two-day auction, the maximum, over all auctions, ratio:
• between SW and any of {Rev (non-adaptive) ,Rev (deterministic) ,Rev (randomized)} is exactly
the harmonic number of v∗, Hv∗ =
∑v∗
i=1 1/i;
• between either of {Rev (deterministic) ,Rev (randomized)} and Rev (non-adaptive) is at least
Ω
(
log1/2 v∗
)
(and at most O (log v∗)); and
• between Rev (randomized) and Rev (deterministic) is at least Ω
(
log1/3 v∗
)
( and at most
O (log v∗) ).
Furthermore, even when the valuations on the different days are independent, there exists a two-
day auction with ratio of Ω (log log v∗) between either of {Rev (deterministic) ,Rev (randomized)}
and Rev (non-adaptive).
Warm up: Revenue vs Social Welfare
To compare non-adaptive auctions to optimal social welfare, we can assume with no loss of generality
that the auction occurs in a single day.
Proposition 12. Let v∗ be the maximal buyer’s valuation, and assume that all valuations are
integral. For a single day auction, the maximum ratio between SW and Rev (non-adaptive) is at
least log(v
∗)
2 .
Proof. Suppose that the buyer has valuation 2 with probability 1/2, 4 with probability 1/4, etc.
until 2n with probability 2−n (and 0 also with probability 2−n). Now, if the auctioneer hands out
the item for free, the expected social welfare is SW =
∑n
i=1 2
−i · 2i = n.
For any choice of price 2k chosen by the non-adaptive auction, the expected revenue is
Rev (non-adaptive) = 2k ·
n∑
i=k
2−i < 2
.
The construction above is extremely useful in proving such lower bounds. In fact it is also used
in our NP-hardness result. The distribution used is approximately the well known equal-revenue
distribution. We will refer to it as pow2 [1, n] to unify our notation. In general:
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Definition 13. We say that v ∼ c·pow2 [a, b] if v = c·2a+i with probability 2−i−1 for all i ∈ [b− a],
and v = 0 with probability 2a−b−1. Note in particular that the expectation is
E [pow2 [a, b]] = 2a−1 (b− a+ 1) .
We conclude this introductory subsection by proving a tight version of the above proposition,
namely
Lemma 14. Let v∗ be the maximal buyer’s valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral.
The maximum, over all single day auctions, ratio between SW and Rev (non-adaptive) is exactly
the harmonic number of v∗.
Proof.
SW =
v∗∑
t=1
tPr [v = t] =
v∗∑
t=1
t (Pr [v ≥ t]− Pr [v ≥ t+ 1]) =
v∗∑
t=1
Pr [v ≥ t]
=
v∗∑
t=1
Rev (p = t)
t
≤
v∗∑
t=1
Rev (non-adaptive)
t
= Rev (non-adaptive) ·Hv∗
where Rev (p = t) denotes the expected revenue from charging t. Finally, note the inequality
can be made tight by setting Pr [v ≤ t] = 1t for all 1 ≤ t ≤ v∗.
Note that in the single day setting, the optimal randomized auction does not achieve more
revenue than Myerson’s fixed price; therefore the same bound immediately holds for adaptive
deterministic and randomized auctions.
Corollary 15. Let v∗ be the maximal buyer’s valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral.
The maximum, over all single day auctions, ratio between SW and Rev (deterministic), and between
SW and Rev (deterministic) is exactly the harmonic number of v∗.
Independent valuations
Surprisingly, adaptive auctions achieve a higher revenue even when the valuations on the different
days are independent.
A well-known approach for extracting the entire social welfare under ex-ante individual rational-
ity is the sale of ”lottery-tickets”, i.e. sell the item before the buyer sees her valuation. A rational,
risk-neutral buyer would be willing to pay the expected social welfare. Here, ex post individual
rationality excludes many such auctions. In the two-day setting this may still be possible:
• We could sell on the first day a ”lottery-ticket” for the second day; we will remain ex-post IR
because of the utility derived from the first-day item.
This sounds promising, but there is one more obstacle to overcome: If the value of the first day
is higher than the cost of the lottery ticket, why can’t we extract it by a fixed price auction on the
first day?
• We will use the same construction from Proposition 12 to ensure that the welfare on the first
day cannot be extracted using a fixed price mechanism.
Informally, we are hiding the ex-post vs ex-ante IR issue in the IC constraints, which we only
require to be satisfied ex-interim.
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Lemma 16. Let v∗ be the maximal buyer’s valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral.
For a two-day auction, the ratio between the Rev (deterministic) and Rev (non-adaptive) can be as
large as (log log v
∗)
4 , even when the valuations on each day are independent.
Proof. Let N = 2n. Let the valuation the first day be distributed as v1 ∼ pow2 [1, n], and on the
second day v2 ∼ pow2 [1, N ]. As we have already seen in the introduction, the optimal revenue for
running two separate fixed-price auctions is a constant Rev (non-adaptive) < 4.
What about deterministic adaptive auctions? The same idea works, except that in the deter-
ministic case, the auctioneer ”punishes” the buyer for lower bids by charging higher prices on the
second day.
On the first day, the deterministic adaptive mechanism will charge the buyer almost the full
price v1 −
(
2− 2−v1
)
. On the second day, we will offer the item for price p2
(
v1
)
= 2N−v
1
. The
buyer’s expected utility from the second day is now exactly
∑
i : 2i≥p2(v1)
2−i
(
2i − p2 (v1)) = v1 − ∑
i : 2i≥p2(v1)
2−ip2
(
v1
)
= v1 −
∑
0≤i≤v1−1
2−i = v1 −
(
2− 2−v1
)
Once again, the buyer’s expected utility on the second day exactly covers the price on the first
day, which guarantees that this auction satisfies IC.
Finally, note the expected revenue is almost as large as the expected valuation on the first day
Rev (deterministic) > n− 2.
Stronger adaptivity gaps for correlated valuations
When the valuations are correlated, we can show stronger adaptivity gaps.
Lemma 17. Let v∗ be the maximal buyer’s valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral.
For a two-day auction, the ratio between the Rev (deterministic) and Rev (non-adaptive) can be as
large as
√
log v∗/4
Proof. Again, let the first-day valuation be distributed v1 ∼ pow2 [1, n]. The second-day valuation
v2 will be conditioned on the first day: v2 | v1 ∼ (v1/n) · pow2 [1, n2].
We already saw that the non-adaptive policy’s revenue on the first day is less than 2. What
is the optimal price for the second day? To answer this question we must consider the marginal
distribution of the second day:
Pr
[
v2 = 2l/n
]
=
∑
k∈[n]
Pr
[
v1 = 2k/n
]
Pr
[
v2 = 2l | v1 = 2k
]
≤
∑
k∈[n]
2−k2k−l = n · 2−l
Therefore, Pr
[
v2 ≥ 2l/n] ≤ n · 21−l, which implies Rev (non-adaptive) < 4.
Now, consider the randomized mechanism that on the first day charges the buyer v1 = 2k (and
allocates the item), and on the second day allocates the item for free with probability k/n. When
the buyer’s true valuation on the first day is 2k, her the expected utility from reporting 2l is given
by
U
(
2k, 2l
)
= (l/n)E
[
v2 | v1 = 2k
]
− 2l = l · 2k − 2l ,
which is maximized by l ∈ {k, k + 1}. The expected revenue from this randomized auction is again
n.
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Similarly, a deterministic auction can charge v1 = 2k on the first day, and offer the item on the
second day for price p2
(
2k
)
= 2n
2−nk/n
U
(
2k, 2l
)
=
∑
i : 2k+i/n≥p2(2l)
2−i
(
2k+i/n− p2
(
2l
))
− 2l
=
(
l − k
n
)
2k −
∑
i : 2k+i/n≥p2(2l)
2−i · p2
(
2l
)
− 2l
=
(
l − k
n
)
2k −
∑
0≤i≤nl+k−1
2−i
(
2k/n
)
− 2l
=
(
l − k
n
)
2k −
(
2− 2−(nl+k)
)(
2k/n
)
− 2l
=
(
l +
2−(nl+k)
n
)
2k − 2l −
(
k + 2
n
· 2k
)
The second line follows because there are nl − k i’s for which i : 2k+i/n ≥ p2 (2l). Notice that
indeed,
(
l + 2
−(nl+k)
n
)
2k − 2l is maximized at l = k.
Deterministic vs randomized auctions
Naturally, one would expect that deterministic and randomized auctions yield different revenues
because we can optimize the latter in polynomial time, while optimizing over deterministic auctions
is NP-hard. In this subsection we show that randomized auctions can in fact yield much more
revenue.
Lemma 18. Let v∗ be the maximal buyer’s valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral.
For a two-day auction, the ratio between the Rev (randomized) and Rev (deterministic) can be as
large as (log v
∗)1/3
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Our proof builds on the constructions in the proof of Lemma 17. A key observation is that by
modifying the parameters for the second day distribution, we can shift the prices without changing
the expected utility. Choosing those parameters based on the valuation in the first day, will allow
us to break the deterministic auctioneer’s strategy, without changing the revenue of the randomized
auction.
Proof. Let v1 ∼ pow2 [1, n]. For type i with value 2i on the first day, the valuation on the second
day will be 0 with probability 1 − 2−2n2i. The remaining 2−2n2i will be distributed according to
2(2n
2+1)i
n pow2
[
1, n2
]
. For any i ∈ [n], let V 2i \ {0} be the set of nonzero feasible valuations on the
second day, conditioned on valuation 2i on the first day. Notice that for any i < j, all the values in
V 2i \ {0} are much smaller than all the values in V 2j \ {0}.
The randomized mechanism, again charges full price v1 = 2k on the first day, and gives the
item for free on the second day, with probability k/n. The buyer’s utility from reporting 2l is:
U
(
2k, 2l
)
= (l/n)E
[
v2 | 2k
]
− 2l = l · 2k − 2l ,
which is maximized by l ∈ {k, k + 1}. The expected revenue from this randomized auction is
again n.
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What about the deterministic auctioneer? Given any deterministic mechanism, let k∗ be the
minimal k for which a buyer with first-day valuation 2k has a nonzero probability of affording both
items. In other words, after declaring valuation 2k
∗
for the first day, her second-day price is at
most p2
(
2k
∗) ≤ 2(2n2+1)k∗+1n < 22n2(k∗+1/2).
Assume that the buyer has valuation v1 = 2l > 2k
∗
. If she deviates and declare type 2k
∗
, she
receives the first item, and she also receives the second time whenever she has nonzero valuation.
On the second day, she pays less than 22n
2(k∗+1/2) with probability 2−2n
2l ≤ 2−2n2(k∗+1). Therefore
her expected pay on the second day has a negligible expected cost (less than 2−n
2
). On the first
day, her price cannot be greater than 2k
∗
. The total expected payment made by the buyer with
v1 = 2l > 2k
∗
is bounded by 2k
∗
+2−n
2
. Summing over the probabilities of having first-day valuation
v1 = 2l > 2k
∗
, this is still less than 1.
Consider all the types whose first-day valuations are lower than 2k
∗
, and yet they receive the
first item. Since they can never afford the second item, on the first day they must all be charged
the same price, thus yielding a total revenue less than 2. Similarly, the types for which the first-
day item is not allocated, must all be charged the same price on the second day. Finally, by IR
constraints the expected revenue from v1 = 2k
∗
is at most 2. Therefore, the total expected revenue
is less than 7.
B NP-hardness
B.1 Fixing the last parameters
One of the most important parameters in our construction is ri: we later prove that ri is the
difference in expected revenue, conditioned on type ti, between pricing at (Bi, Ci), and pricing at
(Ai,Di).
We set rn+1 =
(An+1−P ∗)(γ−1)
2γ4(n+1)
= Θ(n); the rest of ri’s are defined recursively:
ri = γ
4ri+1 − (γ − 1)[ǫ(γ3 − γ) + γ]. (1)
Notice that r1rn+1 ≤ γ4(n+1) = Θ(1).
Let Ci =
γ
γ−1
ri−ǫ
hi
and Di =
γri
(γ−1)hi
. Observe that with the recursive definition of ri (1) we can
get a nice expression for the following difference:
Ci+1 −Di = γ2 1− ǫ
hi
.
The differences between pairs of special prices are summarized in Table 2.
Finally, we want the contribution towards the revenue from each vertex in the independent
set to be the same. To that end, we set r =
∑
1/ri = Θ(1), and weight the probability of
observing each type ti by wi = r/ri. We set the total probability of observing any of the ti’s to be
p = ǫ16nr = Θ(n
−3).
Recall that the IC constraints depend on the integrals of the cumulative distribution functions.
The values of the Fi’s and F∗ in our construction are tailored to make sure that their integrals have
the values described in Table 3.
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Type 0→ Ci Ci → Di Di → Ci+1 Dj−1 → Cj Cj → Dj
2kDn+1 →
2k+1Dn+1
Fi hi
hi
γ
hi
γ2
1−ǫ(2− 1
γ
)
1−ǫ
hj−1
γ2
(2− 1γ )hj hn+1
2k+1γ
edge
1− ǫ
γ
1−ǫ
hi
γ2
hj−1
γ2
hj no edge
F∗ hi
hi
γ2
hj−1
γ2
hj h∗
Table 1: Cumulative distributions
Bi −Ai Ai −Bi+1 An+1 − P ∗ Di − Ci Ci+1 −Di Q∗ −Dn+1
ǫ 1− ǫ n2 + n− ǫ ǫhi γ2 · 1−ǫhi
(
28γ
4(n+1) − 1
)
Dn+1
Table 2: Differences between prices
Type Ci → Di Di → Ci+1 Dj−1 → Cj Cj → Dj Dn+1 → Q∗
∫
Fi
ǫ
γ
1− ǫ 1− (2− 1γ )ǫ (2− 1γ )ǫ
An+1 − P ∗
edge
1− ǫγ 1− ǫ ǫ no edge∫Dj
Ci
Fi = Bi −Aj
∫
F∗
ǫ 1− ǫ 1− ǫ ǫ An+1 − P ∗∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ = Bi − P ∗
Table 3: Integrals of cumulative distributions
Claim 19. The integrals of the Fi’s and F∗ have values as stated in the Table 3
Proof. Follows from multiplying the correct combination of entries of Table 1 and Table 2.
This completes the construction of the instance of Two-day Auction, starting from the instance
of Independent Set. Incidentally, notice that the numbers used are polynomial in the size of the
input graph.
B.2 Proof of the NP-hardness construction
B.2.1 Completeness
In this subsection we show that any independent set S in G corresponds to a feasible pricing in our
auction: (Bi, Ci) for i ∈ S, (Aj ,Dj) for j /∈ S, and (P ∗, Q∗) for type t∗.
Lemma 20. Let S be an independent set of G. There exists a pricing for our auction that satisfies
IC and IR and achieves revenue:
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(1− p)Rev(t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
i∈V
wiRev(ti, Ai,Di) + pr|S|
We first show that the IC constraints are satisfied between any pair of types ti and tj that are
not both charged (Bi, Ci) - edge or no edge in the graph (Claim 21). Then, we show that the IC
constraints are satisfied between type t∗ and type ti, for any i ∈ [n] (Claim 22). Finally we prove
that charging (Bi, Ci) and (Bj, Cj) does not violate the IC constraints if there is no (i, j) edge in
the graph (Claim 23).
Claim 21. Charging types ti and tj, for j > i, any of the pairs (Bi, Ci)/(Aj ,Dj), (Ai,Di)/(Bj , Cj)
or (Ai,Di)/(Aj ,Dj), doesn’t violate the IC constraints between ti and tj.
Proof. We need to show that all the following are always true:
1. ∫ Dj
Ci
Fi(x)dx ≥ Bi −Aj ≥
∫ Dj
Ci
Fj(x)dx
2. ∫ Dj
Di
Fi(x)dx ≥ Ai −Aj ≥
∫ Dj
Di
Fj(x)dx
3. ∫ Cj
Di
Fi(x)dx ≥ Ai −Bj ≥
∫ Cj
Di
Fj(x)dx
It follows from Table 3 that the left hand sides hold. For the right hand sides, first notice that
Fj is always lower than Fi in the intervals we’re interested in. The first inequality is tight for Fi,
thus
∫ Dj
Ci
Fj(x) ≤ Bi −Aj . For (Ai,Di)/(Bj , Cj) and (Ai,Di)/(Aj ,Dj) we will use induction:
• Basis j = i+ 1: ∫ Ci+1
Di
Fi+1(x)dx = (Ci+1 −Di)hi+1 = (Ci+1 −Di) hi
γ4
=
1− ǫ
γ2
< 1− ǫ = Ai −Bi+1
And: ∫ Di+1
Di
Fi+1(x)dx = (Ci+1 −Di)hi+1 + (Di+1 − Ci+1)hi+1
γ
=
1− ǫ
γ2
+
ǫ
γ
< 1 = Ai −Ai+1
• For j we have the following:∫ Cj
Di
Fj(x)dx ≤
∫ Dj−1
Di
Fj−1(x)dx+
∫ Cj
Dj−1
Fj(x)dx
≤ (Ai −Aj−1) + (Aj−1 −Bj) = Ai −Bj
and
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∫ Dj
Di
Fj(x)dx ≤
∫ Dj−1
Di
Fj−1(x)dx +
∫ Dj
Dj−1
Fj(x)dx
≤ Ai −Aj−1 +Aj−1 −Aj = Ai −Aj
Claim 22. When type t∗ is charged (P ∗, Q∗), charging ti the pair (Bi, Ci) or the pair (Ai,Di)
doesn’t violate the IC constraints between ti and t
∗.
Proof. The IC constraints between ti and t
∗ are either
∫ Q∗
Ci
Fi(x)dx ≥ Bi − P ∗ ≥
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗(x)dx
or
∫ Q∗
Di
Fi(x)dx ≥ Ai − P ∗ ≥
∫ Q∗
Di
F∗(x)dx
In both cases, the inequalities can be verified easily using Table 3.
Claim 23. If (i, j) 6∈ E the charging type ti the pair (Bi, Ci) and type tj the pair (Bj , Cj) doesn’t
violate the IC constraints between ti and tj.
Proof. The IC constraint between ti and tj for this pricing is:∫ Cj
Ci
Fi(x)dx ≥ Bi −Bj ≥
∫ Cj
Ci
Fj(x)dx
• j = i + 1: ∫ Ci+1Ci Fi(x)dx = ∫ DiCi Fi(x)dx + ∫ Ci+1Di Fi(x)dx. The first term is equal to ǫγ , and
when there is no (i, i + 1) edge, the second term is equal to 1− ǫγ , thus the left hand side is
immediate. The right hand side is satisfied trivially, since Fi+1 is always below Fi between
Ci and Ci+1 and Fi gives a tight constraint.
• j > i + 1: Again, ∫ CjCi Fi(x)dx = ∫ Dj−1Ci Fi(x)dx + ∫ CjDj−1 Fi(x)dx. From Table 3 we can see
that the first term is always j − 1− i+ ǫ, and the second term is 1− ǫ when (i, j) 6∈ E.
For the right hand side we have
∫ Cj
Di
Fj(x)dx ≤ Ai −Bj from Claim 21. Since Fj is below Fi
between Ci and Di, and
∫ Di
Ci
Fi(x)dx =
ǫ
γ < ǫ we get that:∫ Cj
Ci
Fj(x)dx =
∫ Di
Ci
Fj(x)dx +
∫ Cj
Di
Fj(x)dx
<
∫ Di
Ci
Fi(x)dx+Ai −Bj
< ǫ+Ai −Bj = Bi −Bj
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B.2.2 Soundness
Lemma 24. Let S be a maximum independent set in G. Then any IC and IR auction has expected
revenue at most
(1− p)Rev (t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
i∈V
wiRev(ti, Bi,Di) + pr |S| (2)
Proof outline
We first show that charging the pair (P ∗, Q∗) maximizes the revenue that can be obtained from
type t∗ (Claim 25), and that (Bi, Ci) yields the optimal revenue from type ti (Claim 26). Observe
that even if we could charge the optimal prices from every type, our expected revenue would be
(1 − p)Rev(t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p∑wiRev(ti, Bi, Ci), which improves over (2) by less than prn = ǫ/16.
Intuitively, this means that any deviation that results in a loss of prn in terms of revenue, cannot
compete with (2).
Next, we show (Claim 27) that if (i, j) ∈ E, then we cannot charge both ti and tj the optimal
prices (Bi, Ci) and (Bj, Cj). In fact, we need a robust version of this statement: Specifically, for
some small parameters ζ1, ζ2i (to be defined later), we show that we cannot charge both ti and tj
prices in
[
Bi − ζ1, Bi
]× [Ci − ζ2i , Ci] and [Bj − ζ1, Bj]× [Cj − ζ2j , Cj], respectively.
What can we charge type ti instead? In Claim 28 we show that charging less than Ci would
require us to either not sell the item on the first day, or charge type t∗ less than the optimal price.
On the former case, we would lose pwi · Bi > ǫ/16 revenue, and would immediately imply smaller
revenue than (2). On the latter case, we can use the robustness of Claim 27; namely, we use the
fact that we cannot charge i prices that are
(
ζ1, ζ2i
)
-close to (Bi, Ci). This will imply that we must
change the prices for type t∗ by some ζ
1
∗ on the first day or ζ
2
∗ on the second day. In either case
the lost revenue is again greater than what we could potentially gain over (2). Therefore, we must
charge ti more than Ci on the second day. Claim 29 shows that charging Di is the best option in
this case.
Therefore an upper bound to the revenue we can make is the following: charge (Bi, Ci) for all
i belonging to some independent set S′, and (Bj ,Dj) for all other j /∈ S′. (It is easy to see than
in our construction even these prices won’t satisfy the IC constraints). Now, the revenue given by
these prices is:
(1− p)Rev (t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
i∈S′
wiRev (ti, Bi, Ci) + p
∑
j /∈S′
wjRev (tj , Bj,Dj)
Notice that∑
i∈S′
wiRev (ti, Bi, Ci) ≤
∑
i∈S′
wi (Rev (ti, Bi, Ci)−Rev (ti, Ai,Di) +Rev (ti, Bi,Di))
=
∑
i∈S′
wi (ri +Rev (ti, Bi,Di))
Therefore, the total expected revenue
(1− p)Rev (t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + pr|S′|+ p
∑
i∈S′
wiRev (ti, Bi,Di) + p
∑
j /∈S′
wjRev (tj, Bj ,Dj)
which is at most the expression in (2)
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Preliminaries
We begin by setting our padding parameters: let ζ1 = ǫ4 , and for each i let ζ
2
i =
ǫ
4γ2hi
. In particular,
this implies that for every i, ζ2i hi + ζ
1 < ǫ2 < ǫ − ǫ′. Next, let ζ1∗ = ǫ8 , and ζ2∗ = ǫ8h∗ . We now
have that ζ2i hiγ
2 = ζ1 = ζ2∗h∗ + ζ
1
∗ , which we will use later in the proof. Most importantly, recall
that losing ǫ8 from the revenue from type t
∗, is equivalent to a loss of (1− p) ǫ8 > ǫ16 from the total
expected revenue, which immediately implies that the expected revenue is less than (2).
Optimality of (P ∗, Q∗)
We will now prove that prices (P ∗, Q∗) maximize the revenue from type t∗, in a robust sense:
Claim 25. Charging type t∗ prices (P ∗, Q∗) maximizes the revenue from that type. Furthermore,
if p∗ < P
∗ − ζ1∗ or q∗ < Q∗ − ζ2∗ , then the revenue from type t∗ is lower than the maximal revenue
by at least ζ1∗ or ζ
2
∗h∗, respectively.
Proof. Clearly, P ∗ is the most that we can charge type t∗ on the first day. It is left to show that
Q∗ maximizes the revenue on the second day.
On the second day, we have:
Rev2 (t∗, Q∗) = Q∗h∗ > An+1 − P ∗
Recall that F∗ changes on Ci’s and Di’s, so those are the only candidates we should compare with
Q∗. For any Ci, we have
Rev2 (t∗, Ci) = Cihiγ
2 <
γ3ri
γ − 1
≤ γ
3r1
γ − 1 ≤
γ4(n+1)rn+1
γ − 1 =
An+1 − P ∗
2
Similarly, for Di,
Rev2 (t∗,Di) = Dihi <
γri
γ − 1 <
An+1 − P ∗
2
Optimality of (Bi, Ci)
Similarly, we show that (Bi, Ci) maximize the revenue from type ti.
Claim 26. ∀x 6= Ci Rev2 (ti, Ci) > Rev2 (ti, x)
Proof. Since Fi is constant for all x ≤ Ci, the claim for this domain follows trivially. We will prove
that Rev2 (ti, Ci) > Rev
2 (ti,Di) and deduce from Claim 29 that the claim continues to holds for
any other x.
Rev2 (ti, Ci) = Ci · Fi (Ci) = γ
γ − 1ri − ǫ
=
ri
γ − 1 + ri − ǫ >
ri
γ − 1 = Rev
2 (ti,Di)
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Condition on edges
Below we show that if there is an edge (i, j), then we cannot charge both ti and tj close to their
optimal prices:
Claim 27. If (i, j) ∈ E then it cannot be that (pi, qi) ∈
[
Bi − ζ1, Bi
]× [Ci − ζ2i , Ci] and (pj, qj) ∈[
Bj − ζ1, Bj
]× [Cj − ζ2j , Cj]
Proof. Wlog, let i < j. Assume by contradiction that the conclusion is false.
Then we get
∫ qj
qi
Fi < pi − pj, which is a contradiction to IC constraints for type i:
∫ qj
qi
Fi =
∫ Ci
qi
Fi +
∫ Cj
Ci
Fi +
∫ qj
Cj
Fi
≤
∫ Cj
Ci
Fi + ζ
2
i hi = j − i− ǫ+ ǫ′ + ζ2i hi
< j − i− ζ1
= Bi −Bj − ζ1
≤ pi − pj ,
where the third line follows by ζ2i hi + ζ
1 < ǫ− ǫ′.
Restriction imposed by charging (P ∗, Q∗) for type ∗
The claim below essentially shows that we cannot go around the restriction on prices for neighbors
by reducing the prices:
Claim 28. If p∗ > P
∗ − ζ1∗ and q∗ > Q∗ − ζ2∗ , then in any IC solution either:
• pi > Bi - note that this means that type i cannot purchase the item on the first day; or
• qi > Ci - note that this substantially decreases our revenue for type i on the second day; or
• pi ≥ Bi − ζ1 and qi ≥ Ci − ζ2i
Proof. The negation of the claim gives us two configurations: having pi ≤ Bi and qi < Ci− ζ2i , and
having pi < Bi − ζ1 and qi ≤ Ci. We will show the claim is true by contradiction, i.e. both these
configurations are violating.
Assume first that pi ≤ Bi and qi < Ci − ζ2i . Consider the IC constraint comparing t∗’s utility
when telling the truth and when claiming that she is type ti:∫ q∗
qi
F∗ =
∫ Ci
qi
F∗ +
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ +
∫ q∗
Q∗
F∗
>
∫ Ci
Ci−ζ2i
F∗ +
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ +
∫ Q∗−ζ2∗
Q∗
F∗ =
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ + ζ
2
i
hi−1
γ2
− ζ2∗h∗
=
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ + ζ
1
∗ = Bi − P ∗ + ζ1∗
≥ pi − p∗
where the third line follows from ζ2i
hi−1
γ2
= ζ2∗h∗ + ζ
1
∗ .
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We now return to the other violating configuration, namely pi < Bi − ζ1 and qi ≤ Ci. We now
have ∫ q∗
qi
F∗ =
∫ Ci
qi
F∗ +
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ +
∫ q∗
Q∗
F∗
>
∫ Ci
Ci
F∗ +
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ +
∫ Q∗−ζ2∗
Q∗
F∗ =
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ − ζ2∗h∗
=
∫ Q∗
Ci
F∗ − ζ1 + ζ1∗ = Bi − ζ1 − P ∗ + ζ1∗
≥ pi − p∗
where the third line follows from ζ2i
hi−1
γ2
= ζ2∗h∗ + ζ
1
∗ .
Optimality of (Bi,Di)
We now show that Di is the optimal price on the second day for type ti, conditioned on charging
more than Ci.
Claim 29. ∀y > Ci Rev2 (ti,Di) ≥ Rev2 (ti, y)
Proof. It is easy to see that the second day revenue is maximal for one of the “special points” where
Fi changes. At Di we have:
Rev2 (ti,Di) = Di · Fi (Di) = γri
(γ − 1) hi ·
hi
γi
=
ri
γ − 1
We now compare with each of type of special point:
• What happens if we set qi = Ci+1?
Rev2 (ti, Ci+1) = Ci+1 · Fi (Ci+1) ≤
γ
γ−1ri+1 − ǫ
hiγ−4
· hi
γ2
(
1− ǫ/γ
1− ǫ
)
≤ γ
5ri+1
γ2 (γ − 1) (1 + 2ǫ) =
γri + (γ − 1)
[
ǫ
(
γ4 − γ2)+ γ2]
γ2 (γ − 1) (1 + 2ǫ)
≤ 1 + 2ǫ
γ (γ − 1)ri +
[
ǫ
(
γ2 − 1) + 1] (1 + 2ǫ)
≤ γ
γ (γ − 1)ri −
(
γ − (1 + 2ǫ)
γ (γ − 1)
)
ri +
[
ǫ
(
γ2 − 1)+ 1] (1 + 2ǫ)
≤ ri
γ − 1 −
ri
2γ
+
[
ǫ
(
γ2 − 1)+ 1] (1 + 2ǫ)
The equation in the second line follows from the recursive definition of ri; the last inequality
follows from γ > 1 + 4ǫ. Now, using that ri > 2γ
[
ǫ
(
γ2 − 1)+ 1] (1 + 2ǫ) for all i, we have
that Rev2 (ti, Ci+1) < Rev
2 (ti,Di).
• What happens if we set qi = Di+1?
Rev2 (ti,Di+1) = Di+1 · Fi (Di+1) ≤ γri+1
(γ − 1) hi+1hi+1 (2− 1/γ)
≤ ri+1
(γ − 1) (2γ − 1) =
2γ − 1
γ3
· γri + (γ − 1)
[
ǫ
(
γ4 − γ2)+ γ2]
γ2 (γ − 1)
≤ γri + (γ − 1)
[
ǫ
(
γ4 − γ2)+ γ2]
γ2 (γ − 1)
≤ Rev2 (ti,Di)
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where the last inequality follows from the analysis for Rev2 (ti, Ci+1).
• What about the revenue when we charge Ci+2, Di+2 ? We reduce this case to what we already
know about the revenue from type i+ 1:
Observe that Fi (Ci+1) > Fi+1 (Ci+1), but Fi (Ci+2) < Fi+1 (Ci+2). Therefore,
Rev2 (ti, Ci+2) < Rev
2 (ti+1, Ci+2) ≤ Rev2 (ti+1, Ci+1) < Rev2 (ti, Ci+1) .
A similar argument works for Di+2, and the claim follows by induction for all Cj,Dj .
• Finally, for points x > Dn+1, we will show that Rev2 (tn,Dn+1) is greater than Rev2 (tn, x),
and the claim will follow for all i ≤ n by the previous argument. (Recall that in the domain
x > Dn+1, Fi is the same for all i.)
Fn changes its values at points 2
kDn+1. We have:
Rev2
(
tn, 2
kDn+1
)
= 2kDn+1 · Fn
(
2kDn+1
)
=
Dn+1hn+1
2γ
<
Dnhn
2γ
= Rev2 (tn,Dn) /2
B.2.3 Putting it all together
In Lemma 20 we saw that if there exists an independent set of size |S| there exists an IC and IR
satisfying pricing which yields revenue
(1− p)Rev(t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
i∈V
wiRev(ti, Ai,Di) + pr|S|
In Lemma 24 we saw that any IC and IR satisfying pricing cannot yield more revenue than
(1− p)Rev (t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
i∈V
wiRev(ti, Bi,Di) + pr |S|
where |S| is the size of the maximum independent set in |S|.
All that’s left is to show that a graph with maximum independent set of size |S| − 1 cannot
yield revenue (1 − p)Rev(t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p∑i∈V wiRev(ti, Ai,Di) + pr|S|. To this end we need to
show that,
(1− p)Rev(t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
i∈V
wiRev(ti, Ai,Di) + pr|S| >
(1− p)Rev(t∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
i∈V
wiRev(ti, Bi,Di) + pr(|S| − 1).
or equivalently,
pr > p
∑
i∈V
wi(Rev(ti, Bi,Di)−Rev(ti, Ai,Di)) = p
∑
i∈V
wiǫ
⇐⇒ r >
∑
i∈V
rǫ
ri
⇐⇒ 1 >
∑
i∈V
ǫ
ri
,
which is true since ǫ = 1
n2
, and each ri = O(n). With this the reduction is complete.
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C Given first-day prices, deterministic auctions are easy
Here we include a proof sketch of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. If the prices in the first day are fixed, then the optimum deterministic mechanism
can be approximated by an FPTAS.
This result shows us something very important about the structure of any possible reduction:
the auction gadgets cannot have fixed prices for one of the two days; variation on both days is
required.
Proof sketch.
Imagine that we are given for every type ti a first-day price pi. How would we check if there is a
choice of second day prices such that the IC constraints are not violated? And if that is possible,
how would we optimize over those prices in order to maximize the auctioneers revenue? It turns
out, that these sub-problems are easy; we can construct an FPTAS using an integer program.
We will assume that all types are allocated the item on the first day (an almost identical
algorithm works if this is not the case). It is useful for this algorithm to think about the incentive
constraints as follows: given pi,pj and qi the incentive constraints between ti and tj give a certain
interval in which qj is allowed to be. Specifically, for pi > pj , we can define a lower bound
lbi,j(pi, pj , qi) and an upper bound ubi,j(pi, pj , qi) for qj as follows:
lbi,j(pi, pj, qi) = minq{
∫ q
qi
Fi(x)dx = pi − pj}
ubi,j(pi, pj , qi) = maxq{
∫ q
qi
Fj(x)dx = pi − pj}
The integer program works as follows: first discretize the second day, i.e. we only consider
prices of the form kǫ for some ǫ > 0 and k ∈ N. We have a 0 − 1 variable xki for each type ti and
price kǫ, such that if xki = 1 the second day price is greater than kǫ. Also, we have a number a
k
i
for the revenue of charging type ti price kǫ. Since pi and pj are given, we simply write lbi,j(k) and
ubi,j(k). The integer program is as follows:
max
∑
i
∑
k x
k
i (a
k
i − ak−1i )
subject to xki ≤ xlbij(k)j
x
ubij(k)+1
j ≤ xk+1i
xki ≤ xk−1i
Observe that the constraints matrix is totally unimodular, thus the relaxation gives us an integer
solution.
D Deterministic Auctions with Independent Days
Theorem 5. If the days are independent, the optimum deterministic mechanism can be computed
in polynomial time.
As we observed in Appendix A, the optimal deterministic auction can be rather bizarre - even
when the distributions are independent. Nonetheless, we show below that when the distributions
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are independent, the optimal auction satisfies some strong structural properties, which in turn
significantly reduce our search space.
First, we should decide who gets the item on the first day.
Claim 30 (First-day allocation monotonicity). There exist an optimum auction such that vi >
vj =⇒ x(vi) ≥ x(vj).
Proof. Otherwise, we can switch between the prices and allocations for types ti and tj. Type ti
values receiving the item more, so this does not violate any (IC or IR) constraints.
Henceforth we say that ti is a winning type if x(vi) = 1 and losing otherwise. Since there are
only n+1 possible subsets of losing types we can enumerate over all of them and thus, our problem
is reduced to finding the optimal auction for a given subset of losing types.
Observe that our IC constraints between winning types ti, tj reduce to:
p(vi)− p(vj) =
∫ q(vj )
q(vi)
F (x)dx (3)
In particular having a tight equality means that if we know three of
{
p(vi), p(vj), q(vi), q(vj)
}
,
we can immediately compute the fourth. The the IC constraints between a winning ti and a losing
tj are:
vj − p(vi) ≤
∫ q(vi)
q(vj )
F (x)dx ≤ vi − p(vi) (4)
The following observation is immediate from the IC constraints, and it will be useful in proving
the rest of the structural claims:
Observation 31. Take any truthful auction, and change the prices only for type ti, such that the
utility for type ti does not change. Then the auction remains truthful.
Now, finding two of the three unknown prices becomes much easier thanks to the following
claim:
Claim 32. There exist an optimum auction that satisfies Claim 30, and such that for any winning
type ti either: p(vi) = vi; or q(vi) = 0.
Proof. Let qnext be the maximum point in the support of the second day such that qnext < q(vi),
if such a point exists, and 0 otherwise. Suppose that for any ǫ > 0, p(vi) ≤ vi − ǫ and q(vi) ≥
qnext+ ǫ/F (qnext). Then we can increase p(vi) by ǫ, and decrease q(vi) by ǫ/F (qnext). Observe that
the utility of type ti remains the same, so truthfulness is preserved. Furthermore, the probability
of allocation does not decrease, thus the social welfare does not decrease. Since the buyer’s utility
remains the same, the auctioneer revenue cannot decrease. Finally, all prices remain non-negative.
Essentially the same argument also proves monotonicity for the first-day prices.
Claim 33 (First-day price monotonicity). There exist an optimum auction that satisfies Claims
30-32, and such that if ti and tj are both winning, then vi > vj =⇒ p(vi) ≥ p(vj).
Proof. Similar to Claim 32, if p(vi) < p(vj) we can increase p(vi) and decrease q(vi). The latter is
nonzero by (3).
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Building on the price monotonicity, we can use another enumeration to further reduce our
problem to the case where we know which winning types have p(vi) = vi and which have q(vi) = 0.
So we know one of the prices for every winning type; we just need to find the other price for one of
them. In fact, notice that we have already reduced our search space enough to give an FPTAS by
taking an ǫ-net over the possible prices for any of the items. In the following claim we show that
we can do even better, i.e. solve the problem exactly, since some of the second-day prices actually
lie on the support of the distribution.
Claim 34. In every optimum auction, at least two of the following three conditions are satisfied:
• there exists a winning type ti such that q(vi) is on the support of the second-day distribution
(and it is nonzero);
• the second-day price for all the losing types (observe that it is always the same for all of
them), q(0), is on the support of the second-day distribution;
• one of the constraints between a loser and a winner (4) is tight.
Proof. Using another gradual price increase argument. As long as neither of the first two conditions
is satisfied, we can gradually increase the second-day prices for all types simultaneously. Doing this
with the right proportions maintains the IC constraints. Furthermore the revenue strictly increases:
the prices increase, but as long as we don’t cross any price in the support, the probabilities of selling
the item to each type remain the same.
Once the losing (resp. one of the winning) type’s price hits the support, we can continue to
increase the price for the winning (resp. losing) types as long as the IC constraints between losing
and winning types are loose.
Now, given any two of the three conditions in Claim 34, we can find the all the optimum prices
in polynomial time. If the third condition is false, then we can enumerate to find a winning type
and a losing type with prices in the support; then compute the induced prices for all other winning
types using the IC constraints (3). If either of the first conditions is false, then we find optimum
prices for one of type, and propagate through all the tight IC constraints. This completes the proof
of Theorem 5.
E Randomized auctions: Multiple days, multiple bidders
In this section we will write an LP that will find a revenue-optimal randomized auction for k
independent bidders in a D-days setting.
What is the most general structure of a truthful randomized auction? On the first day, we ask
the bidders for their valuations v1[k] =
(
v11, . . . , v
1
k
) ∈ Rk+, and give a distribution over the allocation
x1 ∈ [k] ∪ {⊥}, and price p1 ∈ [0, v1x1].
On the second day, we again ask the bidders for their valuations v2[k] - here we defer from
the semi-adaptive framework we introduced in the previous section. Given the history v
[2]
[k] =(
v11, . . . , v
1
k, v
2
1 , . . . , v
2
k
)
of the buyer’s responses -and the allocation and price x1, p1 on the first
day- we give a probability distribution for the current allocation and price x2, p2. Notice that the
dependence on x1, p1 means that the allocations and prices on different days may not be independent
- even conditioned on the bidders’ valuations.
Definition 35. An adaptive auction takes as input on each day the history of bidders’ valuations
(including the current), and the history of allocations and prices, and outputs a distribution over
allocations and prices for the current day.
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The main challenge with optimizing over adaptive auctions is the structure of the IC constraints.
In particular, we must handle the following complication: it is possible that lying on day 1 decreases
a bidder’s utility, and so does lying on day 2; yet lying on both days increases her expected utility!
Therefore, when deciding to lie, the bidder must choose in advance among all exponentially many
different strategies that deviate from the truth now and in the future. Nevertheless, we can write
a polynomial size LP using dynamic programming.
As was the case for semi-adaptive auctions, we do not lose generality by restricting to prices
that are exactly feasible valuations:
Claim 36. Let V di be the set of possible valuations of bidder i on day d. Then, given any feasible
adaptive auction A, there exists a feasible randomized adaptive auction A′ where i is always charged
on day d prices in V di ∪ {0,∞}.
Proof. Essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 6.
Finally, we are ready to describe our LP a randomized adaptive auction for k > 1 bidders and
D > 2 days.
Theorem 8. For any number of days D, and a constant number of independent bidders k, the
optimal adaptive randomized auction can be found in time polynomial in the number of types and
in the number of days.
Note that typically, the number of types grows exponentially with D.
Proof. We define an LP that optimizes over all feasible joint distributions of allocations and prices.
The most interesting part is the dynamic programming definition of the IC constraints.
• Probability Variables: We introduce variables that specify the joint distribution of prices
and allocations. Let v
[d]
[k] =
(
v11, . . . , v
d
k
)
denote the history of valuations up to day d, and
similarly let p[d−1] =
(
p1, . . . , pd−1
)
and x[d−1] =
(
x1, . . . , xd−1
)
denote the prices and alloca-
tions determined prior to day d. Let the variable π
(
d, x[d], p[d], v
[d]
[k]
)
denote the probability
that we offer allocate all the items up to time d to bidders x[d] and charge prices p[d] given
valuations v
[d]
[k]. (Of course, we will only maintain variables that corresponds to feasible and
IR allocations and prices.)
• Objective: Our expected revenue from allocating all the items up to time D to bidders
x[D] and charge prices p[D] given valuations v
[D]
[k] is Pr
[
v
[D]
[k]
]∑
d≤D p
d. Our overall expected
revenue is therefore:
Rev =
∑
v
[D]
[k]
∑
x[D],p[D]
π
(
D,x[D], p[D], v
[D]
[k]
)
· Pr
[
v
[D]
[k]
]∑
d≤D
pd
• “Ignorance about the future” constraints: Although our distribution is fully described
by the variables π
(
D,x[D], p[D], v
[D]
[k]
)
corresponding to the last day D, we must make sure
that the marginals on days d < D (π
(
d, x[d], p[d], v
[d]
[k]
)
) do not depend on future valuations
vd
′
i for d
′ > d. For every feasible choice of d, v
[d]
[k], x
[d], p[d]:
π
(
d, x[d], p[d], v
[d]
[k]
)
=∑
ud+1
[k]
∑
yd+1,qd+1
π
(
d,
[
x[d]; yd+1
] [
p[d]; qd+1
]
,
[
v
[d]
[k]
;ud+1
[k]
])
· Pr
[
ud+1
[k]
| v[d]
]
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where
[
x[d]; yd+1
]
=
(
x1, . . . xd, yd+1
)
denotes the concatenation of x[d] and yd+1, and similarly[
p[d]; qd+1
]
=
(
p1, . . . pd, qd+1
)
and
[
v
[d]
[k];u
d+1
[k]
]
=
(
v11 , . . . v
d
k, u
d+1
1 , . . . , u
d+1
k
)
.
• Feasibility constraints: In order for π
(
d, x[d], p[d], v
[d]
[k]
)
to be feasible probabilities, their
sum, for each d and v[d] must be one:
∀d∀v[d][k]
∑
π
(
d, x[d], p[d], v
[d]
[k]
)
= 1
Similarly, they should all be non-negative:
∀d∀v[d]
[k]
, x[d], p[d] π
(
d, x[d], p[d], v
[d]
[k]
)
≥ 0
• IC constraints: As we mentioned earlier, at any day d, each bidder must choose among
exponentially many strategies to deviate from the truth: today, and in the future.
Our LP will use dynamic programming to recursively define the optimal deviation, starting
from the last day D and moving back in time.
Begin from the last day D. Suppose that bidder’s i current valuation is vDi , that her previous
valuations were v
[D−1]
i , and she has reported u
[D−1]
i ; suppose further that the history of other
bidders’ valuation is v
[D]
−i , and that items were allocated according to x
[D−1] for prices p[D−1].
Then bidder’s i utility from reporting uD on day D is given by:
U
(
D, vDi , u
D
i | v[D−1][k] , u
[D−1]
i , x
[D−1], p[D−1]
)
=∑
V D−i
Pr
[
vD−i | v[D−1]−i
] ∑
x[D] : xD=i
π
(
D,x[D], p[D],
[
u
[D]
i ; v
[D]
−i
]) (
vDi − pD
)
Next, for any d ≤ D, given history v[d−1][k] , u
[d−1]
i , x
[d−1], p[d−1], we let U∗ denote the buyer’s
maximal utility from any current and future deviation:
U∗
(
d, vdi | v[d−1]k , u[d−1]i , x[d−1], p[d−1]
)
=
max
ud
U
(
d, vdi , u
d
i | v[d−1][k] , u
[d−1]
i , x
[d−1], p[d−1]
)
Now, given the values of U∗ for day d + 1, we can compute the utility of the buyer from
deviating on day d:
U
(
d, vdi , u
d
i | v[d−1][k] , u
[d−1]
i , x
[d−1], p[d−1]
)
=∑
x[d] : xd=i
π
(
d, x[d], p[d],
[
u
[d]
i ; v
[d]
−i
])(
vdi − pd
)
+
∑
vd+1i
Pr
[
vd+1i | v[d]i
]
U∗
(
d+ 1, vd+1i | v[d]k , u[d]i , x[d], p[d]
)
Finally, our IC constraints require that whenever the buyer reported truthfully so far, she
must maximize her value by continuing to report truthfully. For every feasible choice of
ud, vd, v[d−1], p[d−1],
U
(
d, vdi , u
d
i | . . .
)
≥ U
(
d, vdi , u
d
i | . . .
)
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F No contract requires extensive communication: proof
In this section we prove our main theorem for the no-contract setting is:
Theorem 9. The optimal mechanism for the No-contract Two-day Auction requires multiple
rounds of communication on the first day.
F.1 Construction
The bidder’s valuation on the second day is drawn from one of two distributions D1,D2. Before
the auction, the auctioneer has a prior of (1/2, 1/2) over (D1,D2), but the bidder knows on the
first day from which of the two distributions she will draw her valuation on the second day. We
denote the mixed distribution known to the auctioneer by
(
1
2D1 +
1
2D2
)
. We will introduce many
constraints on those distributions, but the most important one for now is that the Myerson price2
for each separate distribution is low (either 1 or 1 + ǫ for ǫ ≪ 1), while the Myerson price for
the mixed distribution (i.e. the auctioneer’s prior) is high: k, for some sufficiently large integer
1≪ k ≪ 1/ǫ. In order to compensate a truthful bidder who may end up paying the slightly higher
price (1 + ǫ) on the second day, the auctioneer gives her a discount of ǫ/5 on the first day. The
following lemma lists all the properties we require from D1 and D2, as well as some useful notation.
We will assume that we have such distributions for now, and construct them explicitly later.
Lemma 37. There exist distributions D1,D2 that satisfy all of the following conditions:
Myerson pricing The Myerson price given prior D1 over the valuations is 1 + ǫ, for prior D2 it
is 1, and for prior 12D1 +
1
2D2, it is k. Furthermore, for any convex combination of D1 and
D2, every Myerson price is one of these three possible prices.
Bidder’s utility Let u2 (D
′ | D) denote the bidder’s expected utility from the second day auction
when her true distribution is D, but the auctioneer runs a Myerson auction against a (possibly
misreported) prior of D′. Then we require:
Truthfulness u2 (D1 | D1)+ǫ/5 > u2 (D2 | D1) and u2 (D2 | D2) > u2 (D1 | D2)+ǫ/5. (Note
that in this case we can ensure incentive compatibility by giving a discount of ǫ/5 on the
first day whenever the bidder reports D1.)
Value of OTR The value of the OTR to the bidder does not depend on her private
information. We use θ to denote this value.
u2 (D1 | D1) + ǫ/5− u2
(
1
2D1 +
1
2D2 | D1
)
= θ = u2 (D2 | D2)− u2
(
1
2D1 +
1
2D2 | D2
)
.
Auctioneer’s revenue By learning whether the second day’s valuation is drawn from distribution
D1 or D2, the optimal expected revenue increases by at most O (ǫ).
Rev
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
D2
)
≤ 1
2
Rev (D1) +
1
2
Rev (D2) ≤ Rev
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
D2
)
+O (ǫ) .
Given the distributions guaranteed by Lemma 37, we travel back in time and construct a price
distribution for the first day. We want to construct a distribution where the revenue that the
auctioneer can generate by using a Myerson single-item auction is significantly lower than the
optimal social welfare (i.e. the bidder’s expected valuation). Intuitively, the latter can only be
translated into revenue by bundling with the OTR. In particular, this property can be achieved by
2Throughout this section, we use the term Myerson price of a distribution D to refer to the revenue-maximizing
price for a single bidder who samples her valuations for a single item from D.
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the well-known equal-revenue distribution. Let δ be a small parameter (ǫ≪ δ ≪ 1/k), and let l be
a sufficiently large integer (say, l = 100). We set
Pr [v1 = δj] =
{
1
j − 1j+1 j ∈ {1, . . . l − 1}
1
j j = l
Let R denote the expected revenue from the second day when the auctioneer knows which
distribution is used, i.e.
R =
1
2
Rev (D1) +
1
2
Rev (D2)
We prove that with three rounds of communication, the expected revenue is at least
Rev3 ≥ R+ δHl −O (ǫ) , (5)
where Hl is the l-th harmonic number.
With one round, per contra, the expected revenue is at most
Rev1 ≤ R+ 3δ. (6)
F.2 Three rounds of communication
We begin by describing an approximately optimal protocol:
1. The bidder sends her true valuation v1;
2. With probability v1/θ, the auctioneer allocates the OTR (i.e. the auctioneer asks the bidder
for her prior on the second day’s valuation);
3. If allocated the OTR, the bidder reports from which distribution (D1 or D2) she will draw
her valuation on the second day.
• The first item is always allocated (x1 = 1), and the auctioneer charges price p1 = v1 − ǫ/5 if
the bidder reported prior D1, and p1 = v1 otherwise. (On the second day, the second item is
offered for the Myerson price for the auctioneer’s updated prior.)
It is easy to see that the IR constraints are satisfied because p1 ≤ v1, and the first item is always
allocated. We continue to compute the expected revenue from this auction, assuming the bidder
reports truthfully. On the first day, the revenue is at least E [v1]− ǫ/5 = δHl−O (ǫ). On the second
day, by Bullet (Auctioneer’s revenue) in Lemma 37, the expected revenue is at least R − O (ǫ).
Overall we match our guarantee (5).
Finally, we prove that this mechanism satisfies the IC constraints. Given that she is allocated the
OTR, it follows by Bullet (Truthfulness) in Lemma 37 that she maximizes her utility by reporting
truthfully on the third round. We now consider two cases, based on the bidder’s prior for the second
day. We prove that in both cases, the bidder’s expected utility does not depend on the reported
valuation (and thus satisfies IC):
D1 The bidder’s expected utility on the second day from the OTR is θ − (ǫ/5). Upon reporting
a first-day valuation v′, she receives the OTR with probability v′/θ, so her added utility is
v′−(ǫ/5) v′/θ. Similarly, on the first day her expected price is v′−(ǫ/5) v′/θ. Her total utility
is therefore independent of the valuation she reports in the first day.
D2 Analogously to the previous case, the bidder’s expected utility on the second day from the
OTR is θ. Upon reporting a first-day valuation v′, she receives the OTR with probability
v′/θ, so her added utility is v′. On the first day her price is always v′. Her total utility is
again independent of the valuation she reports in the first day.
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F.3 One round of communication
Recall that by our construction for the second-day distributions, for any convex combination of D1
and D2, the Myerson price charged in the second day by the greedy auctioneer is always one of
three possibilities: p2 ∈ {1, 1 + ǫ, k}. The choice of p2 depends on the updated prior based on the
bidder’s single message.
We divide the universe of legal bidder’s messages into three: Mp ⊂ Σ∗ is the subset of messages
for which the second-day price is p, for each of p ∈ {1, 1 + ǫ, k}. Note that for each subset Mp,
the allocation and price on the second day are independent of the choice of message m ∈ Mp. In
particular, any difference between messages must be due to different outcomes on the first day.
Fix any p ∈ {1, 1 + ǫ, k}, and let R1p be the expected revenue on the first day when the bidder’s
message is in Mp. We show that R
1
p ≤ δ by a reduction to selling only the first item. For message
m ∈Mp, let xm denote the probability that the auctioneer allocates the first item to the bidder, and
let πm denote the expected price when allocated. In fact, since both the bidder and the auctioneer
are risk-neutral, we can assume wlog that the auctioneer charges exactly πm whenever the first item
is allocated (note that ex-post IR constraints are preserved). Consider the single-item auction (for
the first item) which requires the bidder to submit a message m ∈ Mp, and then with probability
xm offers the item for price πm. By IC constraints, whenever the bidder submitted a message
m ∈ Mp in the original (two-day) auction, she will continue to submit the same message in the
modified (single-item) auction. Therefore, the revenue collected from this single-item auction is at
least R1p. Finally, observe that due to the equal-revenue construction, the revenue from from selling
the first item independently is at most δ.
Adding the expected revenues from all the feasible p’s we have that the total expected revenue
on the first day at most 3δ. Since the revenue on the second day is always at most R, (6) follows.
This completes the proof of Theorem 9.
F.4 Construction of D1 and D2: Proof of Lemma 37
Lemma 37. There exist distributions D1,D2 that satisfy all of the following conditions:
Myerson pricing The Myerson price given prior D1 over the valuations is 1 + ǫ, for prior D2 it
is 1, and for prior 12D1 +
1
2D2, it is k. Furthermore, for any convex combination of D1 and
D2, every Myerson price is one of these three possible prices.
Bidder’s utility Let u2 (D
′ | D) denote the bidder’s expected utility from the second day auction
when her true distribution is D, but the auctioneer runs a Myerson auction against a (possibly
misreported) prior of D′. Then we require:
Truthfulness u2 (D1 | D1)+ǫ/5 > u2 (D2 | D1) and u2 (D2 | D2) > u2 (D1 | D2)+ǫ/5. (Note
that in this case we can ensure incentive compatibility by giving a discount of ǫ/5 on the
first day whenever the bidder reports D1.)
Value of OTR The value of the OTR to the bidder does not depend on her private
information. We use θ to denote this value.
u2 (D1 | D1) + ǫ/5− u2
(
1
2D1 +
1
2D2 | D1
)
= θ = u2 (D2 | D2)− u2
(
1
2D1 +
1
2D2 | D2
)
.
Auctioneer’s revenue By learning whether the second day’s valuation is drawn from distribution
D1 or D2, the optimal expected revenue increases by at most O (ǫ).
Rev
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
D2
)
≤ 1
2
Rev (D1) +
1
2
Rev (D2) ≤ Rev
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
D2
)
+O (ǫ) .
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Proof. We explicitly defineD1 andD2, and then check that they satisfy all the requirements. We use
D (v) to denote the probability that distribution D assigns to value v. Let O (1/ ln (k)) ≤ α < 1/5
and 1/2 ≤ β ≤ 1 be parameters to be defined soon. We define the first distrbution as follows:
D1 (v) =


1− α v = 0(
α · 12
)− 2ǫ2 v = 1 + ǫ
α ·
(
1
v − 1v+1
)
v ∈ {2, . . . , k}(
α · 1v
)
+ 2ǫ2 v = k
Notice that prices 1 + ǫ and k have probabilities higher than the equal-revenue curve for v ∈
{2, . . . , k}; one of them will always be optimal. Similarly, we let
D2 (v) =


1− β v = 0(
β · 12
)
+
(
k
2 + 1
)
ǫ2 v = 1
β · (12 − 1k)− k2ǫ2 v = 2(
β · 1v
)− ǫ2 v = k
Price 1 has relatively high probability, and price k comes after; thus for D2 alone price 1 will be
optimal, but together with D1, price k maximizes the revenue.
Myerson pricing For prior D1 the maximal revenue is achieved by p2 = 1 + ǫ:
∀p′ ∈ {2, . . . , k} (1 + ǫ) · Pr
v2∼D1
[v2 ≥ 1 + ǫ] = α (1 + ǫ) > α+2p′ǫ2 = p′ · Pr
v2∼D1
[
v2 ≥ p′
]
. (7)
Similarly, for D2 the revenue is maximized by p2 = 1:
∀p′ ∈ {2, k} 1 · Pr
v2∼D2
[v2 ≥ 1] = β > β − kǫ2 = p′ · Pr
v2∼D1
[
v2 ≥ p′
]
. (8)
For the auctioneer’s initial prior, 12D1 +
1
2D2, the revenue is maximized by k:
k · Pr
v2∼
1
2
D1+
1
2
D2
[v2 ≥ k] = 1
2
α+
1
2
β +
k
2
ǫ2 >
1
2
α+
1
2
β = 1 · Pr
v2∼
1
2
D1+
1
2
D2
[v2 ≥ 1] . (9)
Finally, we show that for any convex combination λD1 + (1− λ)D2 of the distributions, the
revenue is maximized by some price p2 ∈ {1, 1 + ǫ, k}. It is easy to see that the the optimal
price belongs to the support of the mixed distribution. Yet, for any p′ ∈ {3, . . . , k − 1} we
have:
k · Pr
v2∼γD1+(1−γ)D2
[v2 ≥ k] = γα+ (1− γ)β + (3γ − 1) · kǫ2
> γα+ (1− γ)β · p
′
k
+ (3γ − 1) p′ǫ2
= p′ · Pr
v2∼γD1+(1−γ)D2
[
v2 ≥ p′
]
Similarly, for p′ = 2 and γ < 1, we still have
k · Pr
v2∼γD1+(1−γ)D2
[v2 ≥ k] > γα+ (1− γ) β + (6γ − k) ǫ2 = 2 · Pr
v2∼γD1+(1−γ)D2
[v2 ≥ 2] .
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Bidder’s utility Recall that u2 (D
′ | D) denotes the bidder’s expected utility from the second-day
auction when her true distribution is D, but the auctioneer runs a Myerson auction against
a (possibly misreported) prior of D′.
Truthfulness When the bidder draws her second day valuation from D1 and the price is
p (D1) = 1 + ǫ, her utility is
u2 (D1 | D1) = α · (Hk − 1− ǫ/2) + 2ǫ2 · (k − 1− ǫ)
together with a discount of ǫ/5 on the first day, it is greater than the utility from price
p (D2) = 1:
u2 (D2 | D1) = α · (Hk − 1 + ǫ/2) + 2ǫ2 · (k − 1− ǫ) = u2 (D1 | D1) + αǫ.
On the other hand, if the bidder draws her valuation from D2, then we have:
u2 (D1 | D2) =
(
β
(
1
k
)
− ǫ2
)
· (k − 1− ǫ) +
(
β
(
1
2
− 1
k
)
− k
2
ǫ2
)
· (1− ǫ) ;
as well as
u2 (D2 | D2) =
(
β
(
1
k
)
− ǫ2
)
· (k − 1) +
(
β
(
1
2
− 1
k
)
− k
2
ǫ2
)
= u2 (D1 | D2) +
((
β · 1
2
)
−
(
k
2
+ 1
)
ǫ2
)
· ǫ.
Therefore, the discount must satisfy
(
β · 12 −
(
k
2 + 1
)
ǫ2
)
ǫ > ǫ/5 > αǫ
Value of OTR The value of the OTR for a bidder with prior D1 is given by
u2 (D1 | D1) + ǫ/5− u2
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
D2 | D1
)
= α · (Hk − 1− ǫ/2) − 2ǫ2 · (k − 1− ǫ) + ǫ/5
= α · (Hk − 1) +O (ǫ) .
The value for a bidder with prior D2 is given by
u2 (D2 | D2)− u2
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
D2 | D2
)
=
(
β
(
1
k
)
− ǫ2
)
· (k − 1) +
(
β
(
1
2
− 1
k
)
− k
2
ǫ2
)
= β
(
1.5−O
(
1
k
))
+O
(
ǫ2
)
.
Finally, in order to achieve equal value of the OTR, choose α and β such that
α·(Hk − 1− ǫ/2)−2ǫ2·(k − 1− ǫ)+ǫ/5 =
(
β
(
1
k
)
− ǫ2
)
·(k − 1)+
(
β
(
1
2
− 1
k
)
− k
2
ǫ2
)
(In particular we can take β = 1 and α ≈ 1.5/Hk.)
Auctioneer’s revenue As we already showed in (7)-(9), the optimal expected revenue from the
second item is approximately the same whether the auctioneer learns the bidder’s partial
information or not:
1
2
Rev (D1) +
1
2
Rev (D2) =
1
2
α (1 + ǫ) +
1
2
β =
1
2
α+
1
2
β +O (ǫ)
versus
Rev
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
D2
)
=
1
2
α+
1
2
β +
k
2
ǫ2 =
1
2
α+
1
2
β +O
(
ǫ2
)
.
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Proposition 1. Let S be a maximum independent set in G. Then any IC and
IR auction has expected revenue at most
(1− p)Rev (∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
wiRev (i, Bi, Di) + pr |S| (1)
Proof outline
We first show that (P ∗, Q∗) maximize the revenue that can be obtained from
type ∗ (Claim 2), and that (Bi, Ci) yields the optimal revenue from type i
(Claim 3). Observe that if we could charge the optimal prices from every type,
our expected revenue would be (1− p)Rev (∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
wiRev (i, Ci, Di),
which improves over (1) by less than prn = ǫ/16. Intuitively, this means that any
deviation from the way we “expect” the solution to behave, would immediately
lose too much to compete with (1).
Next, we show (Claim 4) that if (i, j) ∈ E, then we cannot charge both i and j
the optimal prices (Bi, Ci) and (Bj , Cj). In fact, we need a robust version of this
statement: Spefically, for some small parameters γ1, γ2i (to be defined later), we
show that we cannot charge both i and j prices in
[
Bi − γ
1, Bi
]
×
[
Ci − γ
2
i , Ci
]
and
[
Bj − γ
1, Bj
]
×
[
Cj − γ
2
j , Cj
]
, respectively.
What can we charge type i instead? In Claim 5 we show that charging
less than Ci would require us to either not sell the item on the first day, or
charge type ∗ less than the optimal price. On the former case, we would lose
pwi ·Bi > ǫ/16 revenue, and would immediately imply smaller revenue than (1).
On the latter case, we can use the robustness of Claim 4; namely, we use the
fact that we cannot charge i prices that are
(
γ1, γ2i
)
-close to (Bi, Ci). This will
imply that we must change the prices for type ∗ by some γ1
∗
on the first day or
γ2
∗
on the second day. In either case the lost revenue is again greater than what
we could potentially gain over (1).
Therefore, we must charge i more than Ci on the second day. Claim 6 shows
that charging Di is the best option in this case.
We conclude that we cannot make more revenue that we would from charging
(Bi, Ci) for all i belonging to some independent set S
′, and (Bj , Dj) for all other
j /∈ S′. (In fact, even charging those prices would probably be infeasible). Now,
the revenue given those prices is:
(1− p)Rev (∗, P ∗, Q∗) + p
∑
i∈S′
wiRev (i, Bi, Ci) + p
∑
j /∈S′
wjRev (j, Bj , Dj)
and we have that
∑
i∈S′
wiRev (i, Bi, Ci) ≤
∑
i∈S′
wi (Rev (i, Bi, Ci)− Rev (i, Ai, Di) + Rev (i, Bi, Di))
=
∑
i∈S′
wi (ri + Rev (i, Bi, Di))
Therefore, the total expected revenue is at most (1)
1
Preliminaries
We begin by setting our padding parameters: let γ1 = ǫ/4, and for each i
let γ2i = ǫ/
(
4δ2hi
)
. In particular, this implies that for every i, γ2i hi + γ
1 <
ǫ/2 < ǫ − ǫ′. Next, let γ1
∗
= ǫ/8, and γ2
∗
= ǫ/ (8h∗). We now have that
γ2i hiδ
2 = γ1 = γ2
∗
h∗+γ
1
∗
, which we will use later in the proof. Most importantly,
recall that losing ǫ/8 from the revenue from type ∗, is equavelent to a loss of
(1− p) ǫ/8 > ǫ/16 from the total expected revenue, which immediately implies
that the expected revenue is less than (1).
Optimality of (P ∗, Q∗)
We will now prove that prices (P ∗, Q∗) maximize the revenue from type ∗, in a
rubost sense:
Claim 2. Charging type ∗ prices (P ∗, Q∗) maximizes the revenue from that
type. Furthermore, if p∗ < P
∗−γ1
∗
or q∗ < Q
∗−γ2
∗
, then the revenue from type
∗ is lower than the maximal revenue by at least γ1
∗
or γ2
∗
h∗, respectively.
Proof. Clearly, P ∗ is the most that we can charge type ∗ on the first day. It is
left to show that Q∗ maximizes the revenue on the second day.
On the second day, we have:
Rev2 (∗, Q∗) = Q∗h∗ > An+1 − P
∗
Recall that F∗ changes on Ci’s and Di’s, so those are the only candidates we
should compare with Q∗. For Ci, we have
Rev2 (∗, Ci) = Cihiδ
2 <
δ3ri
δ − 1
≤
δ3r1
δ − 1
≤
δ4(n+1)rn+1
δ − 1
= (An+1 − P
∗) /2
Similarly, for Di,
Rev2 (∗, Di) = Dihi <
δri
δ − 1
< (An+1 − P
∗) /2
Optimality of (Bi, Ci)
Similarly, we show that (Bi, Ci) maximize the revenue from type i.
Claim 3. ∀x 6= Ci Rev
2 (i, Ci) > Rev
2 (i, x)
Proof. Since Fi is constant for all x ≤ Ci, the claim for this domain follows
trivially. We will prove that Rev2 (i, Ci) > Rev
2 (i,Di) and deduce from Claim
6 that the claim continues to holds for any other x.
2
Rev2 (i, Ci) = Ci · Fi (Ci) =
δ
δ − 1
ri − ǫ
=
ri
δ − 1
+ ri − ǫ >
ri
δ − 1
= Rev2 (i,Di)
Condition on edges
Below we show that if there is an edge between vertices i and j, then we cannot
charge both i and j close to their optimal prices:
Claim 4. If (i, j) ∈ E then it cannot be that (pi, qi) ∈
[
Bi − γ
1, Bi
]
×
[
Ci − γ
2
i , Ci
]
and (pj , qj) ∈
[
Bj − γ
1, Bj
]
×
[
Cj − γ
2
j , Cj
]
Proof. Wlog, let i < j. Assume by contradiction that the conclusion is false.
Then we get
´ qj
qi
Fi < pj − pi, which is a contracdiction to IC constraints for
type i:
ˆ qj
qi
Fi =
ˆ Ci
qi
Fi +
ˆ Cj
Ci
Fi +
ˆ qj
Cj
Fi
≤
ˆ Cj
Ci
Fi + γ
2
i hi = j − i− ǫ+ ǫ
′ + γ2i hi
< j − i− γ1
= Bj −Bi − γ
1
≤ pj − pi ,
where the third line follows by γ2i hi + γ
1 < ǫ− ǫ′.
Restriction imposed by charging (P ∗, Q∗) for type ∗
The claim below essentially shows that we cannot go around the restriction on
prices for neighbors by reducing the prices:
Claim 5. If p∗ > P
∗ − γ1
∗
and q∗ > Q
∗ − γ2
∗
, then in any IC solution either:
• pi > Bi - note that this means that type i cannot purchase the item on
the first day; or
• qi > Ci - note that this substantially decreases our revenue for type i on
the second day; or
• pi ≥ Bi − γ
1 and qi ≥ Ci − γ
2
i
Proof. Assume first that pi ≤ Bi and qi < Ci − γ
2
i (we will return to the other
violating configuration of parameters later).
3
Consider the IC constraint comparing ∗’s utility when telling the truth and
when claiming that she is type i:
ˆ q∗
qi
F∗ =
ˆ Ci
qi
F∗ +
ˆ Q∗
Ci
F∗ +
ˆ Q∗
Q∗
F∗
>
ˆ Ci
Ci−γ2i
F∗ +
ˆ Q∗
Ci
F∗ +
ˆ Q∗−γ2
∗
Q∗
F∗ =
ˆ Q∗
Ci
F∗ + γ
2
i
hi−1
δ2
− γ2
∗
h∗
=
ˆ Q∗
Ci
F∗ + γ
1
∗
= Bi − P
∗ + γ1
∗
≥ pi − p∗
where the third line follows from γ2i
hi−1
δ2 = γ
2
∗
h∗ + γ
1
∗
.
We now return to the other violating configuration, namely pi < Bi − γ
1
and qi ≤ Ci. We now have
ˆ q∗
qi
F∗ =
ˆ Ci
qi
F∗ +
ˆ Q∗
Ci
F∗ +
ˆ Q∗
Q∗
F∗
>
ˆ Ci
Ci
F∗ +
ˆ Q∗
Ci
F∗ +
ˆ Q∗−γ2
∗
Q∗
F∗ =
ˆ Q∗
Ci
F∗ − γ
2
∗
h∗
=
ˆ Q∗
Ci
F∗ − γ
1 + γ1
∗
= Bi − γ
1 − P ∗ + γ1
∗
≥ pi − p∗
where the third line follows from γ2i
hi−1
δ2 = γ
2
∗
h∗ + γ
1
∗
.
Optimality of (Bi, Di)
We now show that Di is the optimal price on the second day for type i, condi-
tioned on charging more than Ci.
Claim 6. ∀y > Ci Rev
2 (i,Di) ≥ Rev
2 (i, y)
Proof. It is easy to see that the second day revenue is maximal for one of the
“special points” where Fi changes. At Di we have:
Rev2 (i,Di) = Di · Fi (Di) =
δri
(δ − 1)hi
·
hi
δi
=
ri
δ − 1
We now compare with each of type of special point:
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• What happens if we set qi = Ci+1?
Rev2 (i, Ci+1) = Ci+1 · Fi (Ci+1) ≤
δ
δ−1ri+1 − ǫ
hiδ−4
·
hi
δ2
(
1− ǫ/δ
1− ǫ
)
≤
δ5ri+1
δ2 (δ − 1)
(1 + 2ǫ) =
δri + (δ − 1)
[
ǫ
(
δ4 − δ2
)
+ δ2
]
δ2 (δ − 1)
(1 + 2ǫ)
≤
1 + 2ǫ
δ (δ − 1)
ri +
[
ǫ
(
δ2 − 1
)
+ 1
]
(1 + 2ǫ)
≤
δ
δ (δ − 1)
ri −
(
δ − (1 + 2ǫ)
δ (δ − 1)
)
ri +
[
ǫ
(
δ2 − 1
)
+ 1
]
(1 + 2ǫ)
≤
ri
δ − 1
−
ri
2δ
+
[
ǫ
(
δ2 − 1
)
+ 1
]
(1 + 2ǫ)
The equation in the second line follows from the recursive definition of
ri; the last inequality follows from δ > 1 + 4ǫ. Now, using that ri >
2δ
[
ǫ
(
δ2 − 1
)
+ 1
]
(1 + 2ǫ) for all i, we have that Rev2 (i, Ci+1) < Rev
2 (i,Di).
• What happens if we set qi = Di+1?
Rev2 (i,Di+1) = Di+1 · Fi (Di+1) ≤
δri+1
(δ − 1)hi+1
hi+1 (2− 1/δ)
≤
ri+1
(δ − 1)
(2δ − 1) =
2δ − 1
δ3
·
δri + (δ − 1)
[
ǫ
(
δ4 − δ2
)
+ δ2
]
δ2 (δ − 1)
≤
δri + (δ − 1)
[
ǫ
(
δ4 − δ2
)
+ δ2
]
δ2 (δ − 1)
≤ Rev2 (i,Di)
where the last inequality follows from the analysis for Rev2 (i, Ci+1).
• What about the revenue when we charge Ci+2, Di+2 ? We reduce this
case to what we already know about the revenue from type i+ 1:
Observe that Fi (Ci+1) > Fi+1 (Ci+1), but Fi (Ci+2) < Fi+1 (Ci+2). There-
fore,
Rev2 (i, Ci+2) < Rev
2 (i+ 1, Ci+2) ≤ Rev
2 (i+ 1, Ci+2) < Rev
2 (i, Ci+1) .
A similiar argument works for Di+2, and the claim follows by induction
for all Cj , Dj .
• Finally, for points x > Dn+1, we will show that Rev
2 (n,Dn+1) is greater
than Rev2 (n, x), and the claim will follow for all i ≤ n by the previous
argument. (Recall that in the domain x > Dn+1, Fi is the same for all i.)
Fn changes its values at points 2
kDn+1. We have:
Rev2
(
n, 2kDn+1
)
= 2kDn+1 · Fn
(
2kDn+1
)
=
Dn+1hn+1
2δ
<
Dnhn
2δ
= Rev2 (n,Dn) /2
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